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English Summary 
This dissertation comprises four manuscripts focusing on health risk communication and 
medical decision making. The first manuscript discusses differences, commonalities, and the 
applicability of three major approaches to help patients make better decisions: nudging, social 
marketing, and empowerment. The second manuscript presents results of an evaluation of 
media coverage about the HPV vaccine of newspaper and Internet reports in Germany and 
Spain. Based on predefined standards for transparent, complete, and correct risk 
communication, the analysis revealed substantial shortcomings in how the media informed the 
public. The third manuscript centers on a standard format to communicate treatment benefits 
and harms: relative risk reductions and increases. Such formats have been found to misinform 
and mislead patients and health professionals. One suggestion is to always include 
information about baseline risk to reduce misunderstandings. Results show that even when 
baseline risk was communicated, it depended on the presentation format (percentage vs. 
frequency) and people’s numeracy skills whether they correctly interpreted the risk reduction 
(or increase). Low numerates benefited from a frequency format, whereas high numerates 
performed better independent of the format. Yet, a substantial proportion of participants still 
misunderstood the meaning of a relative risk reduction (or increase). The fourth manuscript 
investigated how laypeople choose between medical treatments when ambiguity is present. 
One objection against communicating ambiguity is the claim that laypeople are ambiguity 
averse in the domain of gains and ambiguity seeking in the domain of losses. Results did not 
find supporting evidence for this claim in medical treatment choice. Moreover, most 
participants selected the same treatment option, independent of numeracy. However, the 
underlying choice strategies varied between individuals.  
 
Keywords: Empowerment, Risk communication, Medical decision making, media analysis, 
Relative risk reduction, Ambiguity 
 
  
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation umfasst vier Manuskripte zum Thema Risikokommunikation und 
medizinischen Entscheidungen. Das erste Manuskript diskutiert Unterschiede, 
Gemeinsamkeiten und die Anwendbarkeit von drei zentralen Ansätzen, die helfen sollen, 
bessere Entscheidungen zu treffen (Nudging, Social Marketing, Empowerment). Das zweite 
Manuskript präsentiert Ergebnisse einer Medienanalyse zur Evaluation von Zeitungs- und 
Internetberichten in Deutschland und Spanien über die HPV-Impfung. Basierend auf 
vordefinierten Standards für transparente, vollständige und korrekte Risikokommunikation, 
deckt die Medienanalyse Schwächen in der Berichterstattung auf. Das dritte Manuskript 
untersucht wie Laien relative Risikoreduktionen bzw. –erhöhungen, ein Standardformt in der 
Medizin, verstehen. Beide Formate führen Laien und Experten in die Irre und führen zur 
Überschätzung der tatsächlichen Effekte. Ein diskutierter Ausweg ist die zusätzliche 
Kommunikation der Basisrate. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Verständnis von relativen 
Risikoreduktionen (-erhöhungen) mit Basisrate von dem Präsentationsformat (Prozent- vs. 
Häufigkeitsformat) und der individuellen Fähigkeit im Zahlenverständnis abhängt. 
Teilnehmer mit geringem Zahlenverständnis profitierten von der Darstellung in Häufigkeiten; 
Teilnehmer mit hohem Zahlenverständnis zeigen ein besseres Verständnis unabhängig des 
Formats. Dennoch—selbst mit Basisrate—missverstehen viele Teilnehmer die 
Risikoinformation. Das vierte Manuskript untersucht wie Teilnehmer Behandlungen unter 
Unsicherheit auswählen. Ein Einwand gegen die Kommunikation von Unsicherheit ist die 
Behauptung, dass Menschen Unsicherheit in Gewinnsituationen vermeiden, in 
Verlustsituationen dagegen suchen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie in Bezug auf die Auswahl 
von medizinischen Behandlungen konnten diese Annahmen nicht bestätigen. Darüber hinaus 
wählte die Mehrheit der Teilnehmer die gleiche Behandlung, wenngleich sich die 
zugrundeliegende Auswahlstrategie unterschied.  
 
Schlagwörter: Empowerment, Risikokommunikation, Medizinische Entscheidungen, 
Medienanalyse, Relative Risikoreduktion, Unsicherheit 
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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parts of this chapter are based on: 
Bodemer, N., & Gaissmaier, W. (2012). Risk Communication in Health. In S. Roeser, R. 
Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, & M. Peterson (Eds.), Handbook of Risk Theory (S. 621–660). 
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.  
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General Introduction 
Understanding health risks is a basic prerequisite for making health decisions. Policy-
makers evaluate health risks to decide about the implementation of health programs, 
insurances assess the cost-effectiveness of health interventions, and doctors and patients need 
to know the statistics of benefits and harms of different treatment alternatives. In particular, 
the concepts of shared decision making and informed consent—that is, the mutual, interactive 
process between the doctor and the patient, who jointly make health decisions—challenge the 
classic paternalistic approach to the doctor-patient relationship. This requires the transparent 
communication of medical risks as a basis for informed decisions (Edwards & Elwyn, 2009; 
Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Mielcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 
2007). Others go even further and call for the “century of the patient” in health care to 
emphasize the importance of transparent information with far-reaching consequences for the 
individual as well as the health care system (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). 
In my dissertation, I will present theoretical and empirical research on risk 
communication and medical decision making that gives insights into how we can help 
patients to understand health risks and make informed decisions. In this chapter, I will 
describe the framework of my dissertation and discuss its significance in the context of 
current research in the fields of medical risk communication and medical decision making.  
Understanding Risks: Numeracy and intuitive design 
 The ability to deal with numbers in medical decision making is important for several 
reasons. It facilitates computation, encourages information search, improves interpretation of 
numerical information, facilitates the assessment of likelihood, and can increase or decrease 
involvement in medical decisions (Lipkus & Peters, 2009). The term numeracy has been 
introduced to describe “(…) the degree to which individuals have the capacity to access, 
process, interpret, communicate, and act on numerical, quantitative, graphical, biostatistical, 
and probabilistic health information needed to make effective health decisions.” (Golbeck, 
Ahlers-Schmidt, Paschal, & Dismuke, 2005). It has been found that the public lacks 
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fundamental skills to deal with risks—a phenomenon that is not limited to laypeople, but has 
also been found in experts (Anderson, Gigerenzer, Parker, & Schulkin, 2012; Reyna, Nelson, 
Han, & Dieckman, 2009). Does this undermine the ideals of shared decision making and 
informed consent? The answer is no; there are at least two complementary solutions to 
overcome innumeracy. The first solution is training. School curricula should include 
programs that would teach children to understand statistical information already in early 
grades. Moreover, health professionals should receive training about different methods of risk 
communication and the best ways of presenting health statistics to their patients. The second 
solution is intuitive design of statistical information. Presenting risks intuitively, that is using 
the principles of ecological rationality, can help overcome people’s difficulties in 
understanding of statistics (Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012). For 
example, people often appear to have difficulties in solving Bayesian inference tasks, such as 
computing the probability of a woman having breast cancer given a positive mammogram, 
based on the hit rate, sensitivity and false alarm rate of the screening test. However, this 
difficulty was mainly observed when the relevant information was presented in conditional 
probabilities. Presenting the same information in natural frequencies facilitated Bayesian 
inferences—a format that simplifies the calculation for the human mind (Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995).  Hence, when risks are presented intuitively, that means, when the external 
format matches the structure of the human mind’s core capacities, we can improve 
understanding.  
What is “good” risk communication?  
The major challenge in health risk communication is discovering how to help patients 
in making better decisions. But what is the objective of risk communication? What is the 
standard by which risk communication should be evaluated? Some argue that the ultimate 
goal of risk communication is to change people’s (health) behavior towards what is 
considered “optimal” (Andreasen, 1995; Lee & Kottler, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). For 
instance, a health campaign might aim at increasing participation rates in cancer screening 
programs such as mammography. Others propose that, because such an “optimal” behavior is 
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difficult to define, the knowledge and education of the patient should be the major outcome 
(Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). This means that one should primarily aim at equipping patients 
with knowledge. One example is informing women about the statistical evidence of 
mammography screening so they themselves can decide whether to participate or not.  
In Chapter 2, I will present a theoretical paper in which we compare three common 
approaches proposed to improve health decisions —nudging, social marketing and 
empowerment—and discuss their applicability in health care. These approaches differ in 
terms of their underlying assumptions about people’s decision making, their aims and the 
strategies implemented to achieve them. Whereas it is often assumed that these approaches 
are mutually exclusive (e.g., Ariely, 2010; Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, Suhrcke, & Kelly, 2010; 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2009), I argue that they are different tools of the same toolbox. None of 
the tools is always best. Rather, its applicability depends on the problem. I suggest that the 
major challenge is to find out when to use which tool.  
The current practice in health care 
Involving patients in the medical decision process requires transparent communication 
of health statistics. Does the current practice in risk communication conform to this ideal? 
Gigerenzer and Gray (2011) identified “the seven sins in healthcare”, the interplay of seven 
factors that produce misinformed and misled patients, resulting in poor health decisions: 
biased funding of research, biased reporting in medical journals, biased reporting in health 
pamphlets, biased reporting in the media, commercial conflicts of interest, defensive decision 
making, and doctors’ lack of understanding of health statistics. Three of these seven sins 
emphasize the problem of biased reporting within the medical community as well as in direct-
to-consumer communication. Biased reporting refers to two phenomena. First, evidence is 
presented incompletely and one-sided. For instance, while the benefit of mammography 
screening on breast cancer mortality reduction is usually communicated, the potential harms 
of the treatment, such as overdiagnosis and overtreatment, are mostly omitted (Gigerenzer et 
al., 2007). Second, evidence is often framed in non-transparent and incomprehensible formats 
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that mislead patients to over- or underestimate the actual underlying effects. Consequences of 
biased reporting are manifold: patients dramatically overestimate the benefit of cancer 
screening programs (Gigerenzer, Mata, & Frank, 2009), patients and health professionals 
ignore the possibility of false alarms, resulting in overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and expensive 
follow-up care, anxieties and fears (Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Lafata et al., 2004). 
In Chapter 3, I will present a study in which I extended previous views on media 
reporting. In a cross-cultural comparison between Germany and Spain, two countries with 
different health systems, I compared newspaper and Internet reports about the human 
papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination. Based on predefined standards for transparent risk 
communication, I evaluated media reports with respect to transparency, completeness and 
correctness of information. Monitoring the current practice of risk communication is 
important for two reasons. First, the media are the most prominent channel to communicate 
medical innovations and treatments to the public (Grilli, Ramsay, & Minozzi, 2009). Second, 
to understand patient’s decision making, it is essential to consider the ecological setting in 
which decisions take place (Todd et al., 2012). The study revealed shortcomings in the current 
practice of risk communication in both countries and proposes ways to improve media 
reporting. 
 “Debiasing” nontransparent risk communication: Relative risk reductions with baseline risk 
Biased reporting is also common in medical journals. One prominent example is the 
use of relative risk reductions to present treatment benefits. For instance, out of 222 abstracts 
in leading medical journals in 2003-2004, 68% failed to state the absolute risk (Sedrakyan & 
Shih, 2007). In 2009, 16 out of 37 articles in the British Medical Journal did not report the 
underlying absolute risks (Gigerenzer, Wegwarth, & Feufel, 2010). This is problematic 
because laypeople and health professionals overestimate treatment effects when presented in 
relative risk reductions (Akl et al., 2012; Covey, 2007; Cranney & Walley, 1996; Edwards, 
Elwyn, Covey, Matthews, & Pill, 2001). One suggestion to resolve this bias is to consistently 
communicate relative risk reductions with baseline risk (Natter & Berry, 2005). 
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In Chapter 4, I will present a paper that shows that the interpretation of relative risk 
reductions (and increases) with baseline risks depends on two factors: the presentation format 
of the baseline risk (percentage vs. frequency) and people’s numeracy skills. Presenting 
baseline risk in frequency format helped in particular low numerates to correctly interpret 
relative risk reductions. High numerates performed better independently of the format. 
However, even when baseline risk was included, a large proportion misinterpreted relative 
risk reductions leading to overestimation of treatment effects. Hence, we propose an 
alternative and more transparent way to communicate benefits and harms.     
Transparent risk communication: The role of ambiguity 
Gigerenzer and colleagues (2007) coined the concept of statistical literacy and 
proposed a minimum set of requirements needed to adequately deal with medical information 
(for an overview, see Chapter 3). One central component of statistical literacy is the ability to 
deal with uncertainty. In contrast to risks, which are generally measureable, uncertainties are 
not (Knight, 1921). However, a less strict definition of uncertainty allows estimating 
parameters of uncertainty, like ranges or confidence intervals (Politi, Col, & Han, 2007). The 
term ambiguity has been introduced to refer to this sub concept of uncertainty (Han, Klein, 
Lehman, Massett, Lee, & Freedman, 2011). Ambiguity plays a major role in medical decision 
making, because evidence is (i) usually limited, due to constraints in the research design (e.g., 
sample characteristic, reliability and validity of measures), (ii) based on population data, and 
hence difficult to be applied to individuals and (iii) based on past events and assume that 
factors in the future do not change (Politi et al., 2007). Ambiguity is rarely, if ever, included 
in medical risk communication. One reason is that it is assumed that people have difficulties 
in dealing with ambiguity and react to it with aversion (Epstein, 1999; Frewer, Hunt, Brennan, 
Kuznesof, Ness, & Ritson, 2003).  
In Chapter 5, I will present a study in which participants had to choose between a 
certain and an ambiguous treatment option. Participants were  presented treatment effects 
about benefits or harms as either a point estimate (the average rate of benefits or harms, such 
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as 20 out of 100 experience the effect) or a range (the lower and upper bound, such as 
between 10 – 30 out of 100 experience the effect). I investigated how ambiguity influences 
treatment choice and which information participants use when being confronted with a range 
(i.e., the size of the range, its upper and lower bounds, or its midpoint). In general, I did not 
find evidence for ambiguity aversion, and observed high heterogeneity in people’s choice 
strategies. Moreover, I found that participants’ preference of a treatment option was rather 
independent of its degree of ambiguity. However, small differences were found depending on 
whether treatment benefits or harms were presented, and on people’s numeracy skills. Results 
suggest that ambiguity is an important element for a decision maker and that its 
communication increases completeness and transparency in risk communication. 
In sum, in four manuscripts I apply psychological theories and methods to help 
patients make better medical decisions. These range from general theories about rationality 
(Chapter 2), their application to standards for transparent risk communication based on 
principles of ecological rationality and intuitive design (Chapter 3), findings and research 
designs from cognitive psychology to understand patient reasoning (Chapter 4), and 
challenging classical concepts on decision making under ambiguity (Chapter 5). Thereby, I 
extend the current knowledge and propose future research directions based on this 
dissertation’s findings (Chapter 6). 
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Abstract 
One way to improve resource allocation in health care is to help patients and health 
professionals make better decisions. Two main approaches have been put forth: nudging and 
social marketing. Our analysis shows that these strategies apply only when there is (1) good 
evidence for a particular treatment and no legitimate alternatives exist or (2) a strong social 
agreement as to what is considered a desirable decision. If these conditions are not met, we 
argue that a third strategy needs to be added to the toolbox—empowerment based on 
education and transparent communication—to allow health professionals and patients 
compare risks and benefits across treatments and assume their responsibilities as partners in 
negotiating care decisions. To better harness the power of the available public health 
strategies, we specify when to apply which of the three strategies to facilitate better health 
decisions. 
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Introduction 
 Modern health systems are plagued with the tenacious problem of unwarranted practice 
variation, that is, underuse, overuse, and misuse of resources (Goodlee, 2011; Wennberg, 
1984). How can this challenge be tackled? One avenue to improving resource allocation is to 
help patients and health professionals make better decisions and ultimately do what is “best” 
for them and society (Andreasen, 1995; Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
The two most common approaches are nudging (Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, Suhrcke, & Kelly, 
2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) and social marketing (Andreasen, 1995; Evans, 2006). Based 
on an analysis of their underlying assumptions, we argue that these approaches should be 
applied only if one of the following conditions is met: (a) there is good evidence for a 
dominant therapeutic or diagnostic procedure and no alternatives are available or (b) there is a 
“strong social agreement” as to what is considered a good decision such as agreeing to be a 
potential organ donor or staying at home when sick with a contagious disease. If neither of 
these conditions is met, a third strategy needs to be added to the public health toolbox—
empowerment of patients and health professionals based on education and transparent 
communication—to enable the negotiation of desirable decisions and care solutions 
(Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). We first outline the nudging and social marketing approaches. 
Then we discuss their assumptions to elaborate why a third strategy is needed and introduce 
particular empowerment strategies. Finally, we specify which strategies to apply for what 
kind of care decision.   
Comparison of the three major approaches 
Nudging 
The method used to nudge people—designing environments that afford certain 
actions—has a long tradition in the field of human factors and ergonomics (Norman, 1988). 
Its rationale differs from traditional approaches to environmental design, however. Nudging 
assumes that people’s choices must be guided because mental capacity limitations result in 
decisions that are systematically inferior to the normative standards implied by those who 
nudge. Rather than elaborating rationales, raising awareness, or educating people, the quality 
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of health decisions is therefore improved by designing environments that facilitate good and 
deter inferior decisions (Ariely, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). An example is to change 
opt-in to opt-out defaults to increase registration rates for organ donation as a socially 
desirable behavior (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
Social marketing 
Social marketing is based on the assumption that “if marketing can encourage us to 
buy a Ferrari, it can persuade us to drive safely” (Hastings, 2006). Its goal is “to influence 
health behavior” and raise awareness about (socially) desirable behaviors in specific 
populations, by targeting their values and motivations via appropriate communication 
channels (Evans, 2006). Channels may range from the mass media to message placements, 
community outreach, and interpersonal communication. Examples include social marketing 
strategies to contain the spread of flu germs across the population as in the NHS’s “Catch it, 
bin it, kill it” campaign or to increase registration rates for organ donations.  
Empowerment 
Both nudging and social marketing are based on the assumption that there are well-
defined objective or social criteria for good health decisions that are agreed upon by both the 
public and the designers of nudging and social marketing campaigns. Assumed and patient 
relevant criteria may not always coincide, even if they appear to be objective and clear-cut. 
Consider the example of an American Indian patient with hip dysplasia (Rabin, Barnett, 
Arnold, Freiberger, & Brooks, 1965). To avoid walking with a limp and risk long-term 
osteoarthritis due to increased wear, an initiative similar to “Doctors without Borders” 
surgically resolved the patient’s hip dysplasia. Although the diagnosis and procedures seemed 
medically correct to both physicians and the patient, the operation ultimately failed relative to 
the patient’s cultural values and norms. A common side effect of the surgery—reduced hip 
function—thwarted his ability to meet with his tribe (a cultural value) sitting cross-legged in a 
circle on the ground (a cultural norm).  
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The key issue is that nudging and social marketing are primarily concerned about 
behavioral change—thereby both approaches are often silent about the underlying rationale 
for such a change. This hinders patients to question the direction into which a behavior is 
supposed to be guided. Why is that? The reason therefore lies in a more implicit second 
assumption of these approaches: suboptimal decisions relate to a lack of mental abilities such 
as cognitive biases (nudging) or a lack of knowledge and motivation (social marketing). In 
fact, many patients know surprisingly little about basic medical facts and procedures 
(Bachmann, Gutzwiller, Puhan, Steurer, Steurer-Stey, & Gigerenzer, 2007) and lack basic 
skills for accessing high quality medical information (Feufel & Stahl, 2012). Also, both 
patients and health professionals have problems understanding health statistics because they 
are provided with non-transparent information sources (Bodemer, Müller, Okan, Garcia-
Retamero, & Neumeyer-Gromen, 2012). However, there is growing evidence that this can be 
changed. Research has shown that transparent communication can improve comprehension 
and knowledge of health statistics (Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2012; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, 
Kurz-Mielcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007), self-care behaviors (Feufel, Schneider, & 
Berkel, 2010), and even increase adherence to public health campaigns (Schneider, Feufel, & 
Berkel, 2011). Thus, whether the assumption of lacking abilities, knowledge, or motivation 
holds depends on how medical evidence and how information is communicated.  
So what if the assumptions underlying nudging and social marketing are not met?  If 
there are multiple normative criteria as in the example of an American Indian with hip 
dysplasia, patients and health professionals must negotiate their decisions. This requires that 
people have the skills to find and evaluate medical evidence and are provided with 
transparently formatted information. To empower patients and health professionals to 
negotiate good health decisions, a two-pronged approach is necessary (Feufel, Antes, Nelson, 
Gigerenzer, Gray, & Mäkela, 2011): First, environmental (i.e., information) design to inform 
patients transparently about self-care behaviors (Feufel et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2011) 
and both patients and health care professionals about the benefits and harms of available 
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diagnostic and treatment options (Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2012; Gigerenzer et al., 2007); 
Second, educational interventions to provide patients and health professionals with the basic 
skills to find and evaluate quality medical evidence (Feufel & Stahl, 2012; Gigerenzer et al., 
2007). Hence, in contrast to nudging and social marketing, patient knowledge is the primary 
objective—behavioral change may or may not be a consequence.  
When to apply which strategy? 
A toolbox of strategies is useful only if one knows when to apply which tool. In this 
section, we review the applicability of nudging, social marketing, and empowerment with 
respect to three major types of care that have been identified in the literature (Wennberg, 
1984): efficient care, preference-sensitive care, and supply-sensitive care (for a summary see 
Table 1).  
Efficient care 
No doubt, there are situations where efficient care practices should be applied to 
achieve optimal care outcomes and avoid medical errors. For instance, to avoid severe 
infections from central vein catheters, simple checklists of hygiene measures have been 
proven effective and should therefore be followed (Pronovost et al., 2010). Nudging and 
social marketing approaches seem to be well suited to implement efficient care practices in 
medical settings. However, many medical decisions have to be made under considerable 
uncertainty, not simply related to limited or conflicting evidence but to the supply of 
resources and expertise as well as patient preferences.   
Preference-sensitive care 
If legitimate treatment alternatives exist, involving tradeoffs among possible 
treatments and outcomes, care is preference-sensitive and the “best” decision cannot be made 
without considering patient preferences (O’Connor, Llewellyn-Thomas, & Flood, 2004). In 
such cases, prerequisites for nudging and social marketing are not met and it is ethically 
questionable to nudge or apply social marketing without informing about the available 
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options, ways to implement them as well as their benefits and harms. For preference-sensitive 
care, transparent communication and understanding of the available and lacking evidence is 
the necessary basis for informed health decisions (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011).  
Supply-sensitive care 
Since the early 1980s, Jack Wennberg and colleagues have identified unwarranted 
practice variations in the U.S. such as tonsillectomy rates varying between 8% and 70% 
among children in the state of Vermont. According to Wennberg, these variations reflect 
Roemer’s law: greater supply of resources and experts tends to result in more physician visits, 
testing, and in-patient treatments, independent of medical need (Dartmouth Atlas Project, 
2007). Moreover, patients in regions with higher utilization rates due to greater supply show 
slightly increased mortality and lower satisfaction with care (Fisher, Wennberg, Stukel, 
Gottlieb, Lucas, & Pinder, 2003). If more care is not better, there should be strong social 
agreement to improve resource allocation. Thus, nudging and social marketing campaigns can 
and should be applied to stop health professionals and private corporations maximize supply 
usage rates and profits. Empowerment approaches must further support these efforts by 
making supply-induced variations transparent and accessible to health professionals and 
patients so they can compare and adapt care delivery practices (Mulley & Wennberg, 2011). 
A matter of target  
Independent of which kind of care is at issue, the choice of the tool depends on which 
objective a communicator pursues. Shared decision making and informed consent focus on 
knowledge as the major outcome, but a communicator might be primarily concerned about 
changing behavior, independently of whether the patient is informed or not. 
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Table 1 
 Assumptions, Tools, and Applicability of Three Major Approaches to Improving Health Decisions.   
 Assumptions Tools Applicability 
Nudging 1. There is a normative 
decision criterion, 
either supported by 
evidence or social 
agreement  
2. Lack of mental 
capacities warrant 
behavioral guidance 
1. Environmental design to 
facilitate or deter 
(un)desirable behaviors 
without providing rationales  
1. Efficient care 
2. Supply-sensitive care 
Social Marketing 1. There is a normative 
decision criterion, 
either supported by 
evidence or social 
agreement  
2. Lack of knowledge 
or motivation warrant 
behavioral guidance 
1. Knowledge/awareness 
campaigns provide rationales 
to advertise or discourage 
(un)desirable behaviors  
1. Efficient care 
2. Supply-sensitive care 
Empowerment 1. There are multiple 
decision criteria so 
patients and health 
professionals must 
negotiate medical 
decisions 
1. Environmental design to 
facilitate comprehension  
2. Knowledge/awareness 
campaigns to support 
negotiation of decisions  
1. Efficient care 
2. Preference-sensitive care 
3. Supply-sensitive care  
 
Conclusions 
The three approaches to better medical decisions we described in this article – 
nudging, social marketing, and empowerment – are not mutually exclusive, but part of one 
toolbox aimed at improving health decisions (see Table 1). Just like you may choose between 
front, rear, or four-wheel drive to maneuver unwieldy terrain, interventions aimed at 
improving health system functioning should change both the health care system and support 
its patients and health professionals (Feufel et al., 2011). Whereas nudging implies health 
system redesign to subtly prompt desirable and deter undesirable behaviors, social marketing 
aims at changing individuals' choices directly by campaigning for and against certain health 
behaviors. Neither one of these approaches will suffice by itself. We have argued that nudging 
and social marketing approaches are suitable if there is (a) good evidence for a particular 
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treatment and no legitimate alternatives exist or (b) a strong social agreement as to what is 
considered a desirable decision and behavioral change is to be achieved rather independent of 
patient involvement. In most (other) cases, patients and physicians must negotiate their 
decisions. One necessary requirement is therefore to empower patients and health 
professionals; first by educating patients how they can find and evaluate quality medical 
evidence, and second, by providing transparent information about the available (or missing) 
evidence, self-care behaviors, and supply-induced usage patterns.  
Nudging and social marketing are popular tools to facilitate better decisions in patients 
and health professionals. The analysis of their underlying assumptions and methods showed 
that we must enrich the available toolbox by introducing a third alternative, empowerment, 
that works when the others fail and guide tool selection based on the kind of care decisions 
patients and health professionals face. With the right tool in hand we will be better able to 
harness their powers and ultimately improve health decisions.  
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Abstract 
The media is a powerful tool for informing the public about health treatments. In 
particular, the Internet has gained importance as a widely valued source for health information 
for parents and adolescents. Nonetheless, traditional sources, such as newspapers, continue to 
report on health innovations. But do websites and newspaper reports provide balanced 
information? We performed a systematic media analysis to evaluate and compare media 
coverage of the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine on websites and in newspapers in 
Germany and Spain. We assessed to what extent the media provide complete (pros and cons), 
transparent (absolute instead of relative numbers), and correct information about the 
epidemiology and etiology of cervical cancer as well as the effectiveness and costs of the 
HPV vaccine. As a basis for comparison, a fact box containing current scientific evidence 
about cervical cancer and the HPV vaccine was developed. The media analysis included 61 
websites and 141 newspaper articles in Germany, and 41 websites and 293 newspaper articles 
in Spain. Results show that 57% of German websites and 43% of German newspaper reports 
communicated correct estimates of epidemiological data, whereas in Spain 39% of the 
websites and 20% of the newspaper did so. While two thirds of Spanish websites explicitly 
mentioned causes of cervical cancer as well as spontaneous recovery, German websites 
communicated etiological information less frequently. Findings reveal that correct estimates 
about the vaccine’s effectiveness were mentioned in 10% of German websites and 6% of 
German newspaper reports; none of the Spanish newspaper reports and 2% of Spanish 
websites reported effectiveness correctly. Only German websites (13%) explicitly referred to 
scientific uncertainty regarding the vaccine’s evaluation. We conclude that the media lack 
balanced reporting on the dimensions completeness, transparency, and correctness. We 
propose standards for more balanced reporting on websites and in newspapers. 
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Introduction 
The media play an important role in informing and educating the public about health 
interventions (Chapman & Lutton, 1994; James, James, Davies, Harvey, & Tweedle, 1999). 
In particular, the Internet seems to replace traditional sources such as newspapers and 
pamphlets (Hesse, Nelson, Kreps, Coyle, Arora, Rimer, et al., 2005). For instance, up to 47% 
of European Internet users look for health-related information online (European Commission, 
2011). About two thirds of U.S. Internet users seek online information about diseases and 
symptoms, and about half look for information on prescription drugs (Fox, 2011). Parents 
preferred the Internet as the second most important source after health care providers for 
health-related information for their children (D’Alessandro, Kreiter, Kinzer, & Peterson, 
2004; Khoo, Bolt, Babl, Jury, & Goldman, 2008). Adolescents also obtain health information 
on the Internet (Gray, Klein, Noyce, Sesselberg, & Cantrill, 2005): they show high 
familiarity, competency and comfort with this medium, and the Internet assures anonymity 
when queries are about sexuality and related risks.  
Despite the increasing impact of the Internet, newspapers remain an important channel 
for disseminating information about public health issues (Slater, Long, Bettinghaus, & 
Reineke, 2008; Stryker, Moriarty, & Jensen, 2008): newspapers reach a large segment of the 
population, across ages and without regard to Internet accessibility. They offer a trustworthy 
and usually concise alternative to the Internet, without requiring active information search. 
Especially people lacking basic media literacy skills have difficulty identifying reliable and 
trustworthy information and feel easily overwhelmed by the Internet (Morahan-Martin, 2004). 
Both media types represent an important public resource for health news, treatments, and 
innovations, but they differ on accessibility, target population, and information presentation. 
Media analysis of the HPV vaccine 
We conducted a content analysis of the media coverage of the human papillomavirus 
(HPV) vaccine. We aimed to evaluate websites and newspaper reports about the vaccine in 
two countries—Germany and Spain. Several reasons make the HPV vaccine a suitable subject 
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for a media analysis: First, it has received extensive media coverage in several countries due 
to its innovative application for cancer prevention and its public health relevancy (targeting 
girls 12–17 years old), and critical voices have questioned the vaccine’s introduction (Dören 
et al., 2008; Martin-Llaguno & Alvarez-Dardet, 2010). Second, information about the vaccine 
addresses parents and adolescents; both groups seek health information on the Internet and in 
newspaper reports. 
Previous media analyses of the HPV vaccine have already pointed out a lack of basic 
information about risk factors, transmission, and symptoms (Abdelmutti & Hofman-Goetz, 
2009; Habel, Liddon, & Stryker, 2009; Kelly, Leader, Mittermaier, Hornik, & Cappella, 
2009). Tozzi and colleagues (2010) found higher accessibility, credibility, and content ratings 
on English websites compared with Italian websites. Additionally, public health and 
university websites scored higher on credibility, content, and design compared with private or 
company websites. We extended previous research by comparing reports from two different 
media types, newspapers and Internet websites, in two countries whose media coverage about 
the HPV vaccine has not yet been assessed: Germany and Spain. We assessed websites and 
newspapers because (1) their target groups differ in age, income, and education (Cotton & 
Gupta, 2004), (2) the Internet represents a rather new way to inform about health, and (3) 
Internet sources often provide information tailored for specific groups, whereas newspaper 
reports address a broader audience (Schönbach, de Waal, & Lauf, 2005). Previous analyses 
assessed the quality and readability of websites (Tozzi et al., 2010) and the completeness of 
information in different media types (Abdelmutti & Hoffman-Goetz, 2009; Habel et al., 2009; 
Kelly et al., 2009). Our analysis focused on the evaluation of the content: we assessed what 
information was provided, whether the information was based on evidence, and what format 
was used to communicate this information. Our main objective was to assess how basic 
information about epidemiology, etiology, and benefits and harms of the HPV vaccine is 
communicated. In particular, we assessed the prevalence of biased reporting about the HPV 
vaccine. 
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The risks of biased reporting   
Biased reporting is a real risk in the media’s coverage of health issues (Gigerenzer & 
Gray, 2011; Gigerenzer, Wegwarth, & Feufel, 2010). Bias can result from providing 
incomplete information (e.g., omitting drawbacks) or using nontransparent information 
formats (e.g., reporting relative instead of absolute risk reductions). Several media analyses 
have documented shortcomings of media health coverage (Frost, Frank, & Maibach, 1997; 
Kurzenhäuser, 2003; Moynihan et al., 2000; Steckelberg, Balgenorth, & Mühlhauser, 2001). 
Often, important numerical information is lacking or fragmented (Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, 
Kurz-Mielcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007). As a result, patients can be misinformed and 
misled. An illustrative example is the Pill scare in the United Kingdom: when the U.K. 
Committee on Safety for Medicine stated that the risk of life-threatening blood clots in legs or 
lungs had increased twofold, that means by 100%, in the third generation of the oral 
contraceptive pill, many women stopped taking it. Results were unwanted pregnancies and 
abortions. In fact, the above-mentioned 100% can be translated as follows: 1 in 7000 women 
who took the second generation of the contraceptive pill suffered from blood clots; 2 in 7000 
who took the third generation pill did (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). Communicating risk 
reductions and increases in relative rather than absolute formats leads to an overestimation of 
treatment effects (Covey, 2007).  
Further evidence underlines the media’s power to influence health attitudes, intentions, 
and behaviors. A survey by the National Health Council found that media reports led to health 
behavior change in 58% of the respondents (Roper Starch Worldwide, 1997). Even health 
professionals may be influenced by media reports when it comes to the prescription of 
treatments and drugs (Maclure et al., 1998). The Internet also affects the physician–patient 
relationship, as patients tend to form their beliefs and expectations before meeting the 
physician (Murray et al., 2003). In sum, information from the media becomes a double-edged 
sword: informed patients can increase the quality of the physician–patient interaction and 
improve health outcomes. However, misinformed patients might have increased or false 
expectations. They may also be influenced by a fundamental lack of the background 
Chapter 3 – Media analysis HPV vaccine  33 
 
knowledge necessary for understanding health-relevant information (Galesic & Garcia-
Retamero, 2010; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2009; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 
1997). Interpreting health risks requires a minimum knowledge of statistical concepts and 
numeracy skills (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). The lack of background knowledge or an inability 
to deal with numbers can be addressed by framing the risks in the health environment in a 
certain way. For instance, the presentation of absolute risk reduction instead of relative risk 
reduction (Covey, 2007), the use of natural frequencies instead of conditional probabilities 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), and the use of visual aids to communicate numerical 
information improve risk understanding substantially (Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & 
Gigerenzer, 2009).   
Intercultural comparison   
Germany and Spain differ in their health systems, Internet usage, and HPV vaccine 
uptake. Spaniards are less proactive in seeking health information and have lower 
expectations of getting involved in health decisions (Delgado et al., 2010; Coulter & Jenkins, 
2005). Computer and Internet use in Germany is more than twice the rate in Spain (WHO, 
2011a), and a higher proportion of users search for health information in Germany (41%; 
Spain: 25%, see European Commission, 2010). The two countries differ on mortality rates of 
cervical cancer, with lower rates in Spain (WHO, 2011b). Finally, immunization rates differ: 
Whereas Germany reported a vaccination rate of 32% for girls aged 12–17 years in October 
2009 (Fricke, 2010), Spain reported a rate of 77% for girls aged 11–14 years in the same 
period, achieved via school-based vaccination programs (Ministerio de Sanidad, 2011). In 
contrast, the German programs were opportunistic. Such cultural traditions can substantially 
affect the communication of information about HPV and the vaccine, as well as people’s 
health-related behaviors.  
In sum, the media have the power to change people’s health attitudes and behaviors by 
influencing risk perception and the physician–patient relationship (Grilli, Ramsey, & 
Minozzi, 2009). It is therefore crucial to assess how the media communicate health (risk) 
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information to ensure transparent and balanced reporting. Biased reporting is evaluated on 
standards defining risk communication research, described below (Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 
2012; Bunge, Mühlhauser, & Steckelberg, 2010; Gigerenzer et al., 2007, Steckelberg, Berger, 
Köpke, Heesen, & Mühlhauser, 2005).  
Method 
We conducted a two-step systematic literature search: the Internet search involved 
scanning websites from governmental institutions, health authorities, medical societies and 
associations, insurance providers, and pharmaceutical companies in Germany and Spain (see 
Appendix A). We used as search criteria “HPV” and “vaccination,” or “human papillomavirus 
vaccination.” We next performed a LexisNexis search identifying newspaper articles about 
HPV and cervical cancer in each country (see Appendix B). To document media reporting 
during the vaccine’s implementation, search periods covered March 2007–June 2009 for 
newspaper reports and January 2009–May 2009 for websites. The Web search was restricted 
to the websites accessible during the search process.  
Pre-defined inclusion criteria focused on reports that (a) intended to inform about the 
HPV vaccine, (b) had a minimum length of 200 words (to exclude brief notes or unspecific 
material about prevention programs), and (c) addressed primarily laypeople. To code the 
media reports, we reviewed medical literature on cervical cancer and the HPV vaccine 
(Neumeyer-Gromen, Bodemer, Müller, & Gigerenzer, 2011; see Appendix C). We focused on 
information important to decision makers when evaluating the HPV vaccine program for 
eventual participation. Our conceptual framework was based on the concept of “minimal 
statistical literacy” (Gigerenzer et al., 2007) and the criteria for evidence-based patient 
information (Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2012; Bunge et al., 2010; Steckelberg et al., 2005). 
Gigerenzer et al. (2007) coined the term minimal statistical literacy to describe prerequisites 
for understanding (health) risks. The concept involves the acceptance of uncertainty in health, 
the adequate evaluation of risks (e.g., Does a risk refer to a lifetime risk? Does a risk refer to 
subpopulations? Does a risk refer to mortality or morbidity?), balanced information about 
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benefits and harms of a treatment, and the diagnostic value of a test (e.g., concepts like base 
rate, sensitivity, specificity, false alarm rates). Steckelberg et al. (2005) defined criteria for 
evidence-based patient information addressing transparency and comprehensibility. Criteria 
cover the content and the presentation format of information and suggest putting numerical 
information into context with other diseases or effects of alternative treatments. Bodemer and 
Gaissmaier (2012) discussed the advantages of numerical probabilities over verbal probability 
estimates, absolute over relative risk reductions, and natural frequencies over conditional 
probabilities, the benefits of visual aids, and transparent communication of uncertainties. 
Finally, Schwartz, Woloshin and Welch (2009) proposed fact boxes as a tool for summarizing 
medical evidence. Fact boxes include baseline risks, benefits, and harms of treatments by 
comparing a treatment group with a control group as well as information about etiology and 
the target population. Based on all above standards, the following dimensions for assessing 
reporting on websites and in newspapers were defined:   
(1) Completeness (benefits and harms and side effects)  
(2) Transparency (presentation of benefits and harms in absolute numbers instead of or at 
least in addition to relative numbers) 
 (3) Correctness (evidence-based information)   
The evaluation criteria resulted in our coding scheme having three main content 
categories: (1) epidemiological, etiological, and pathological information about HPV, 
dysplasia, and cervical cancer, (2) information about the HPV vaccine and its benefits and 
harms, and (3) cost estimates of the vaccine. We applied the dimensions—completeness, 
transparency, and correctness—on each of the three categories. The fact box (Appendix C) 
displays the results of our literature search and provides background for the content 
categories. The scientific evidence is based on the findings for Gardasil in May 2009. 
Gardasil was the first vaccine approved and had the highest market share. Statistics about the 
vaccine’s effectiveness were taken from the studies conducted to gain the vaccine’s approval 
(see separate reference list for the fact box). To ensure comparability, the same coding 
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scheme was adopted for both media types. As LexisNexis does not map visualization, this 
category was limited to websites. Websites from health institutions and health authorities 
were only included if they were (1) characterized by high reliability and reputability and (2) 
easily accessible with common search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or Bing. We also 
included websites from the pharmaceutical companies producing the vaccine.  
Two authors (ANG, NB) developed the coding scheme. It contained five sections: (1) 
identification of authors, communicators, and the target population; (2) epidemiological 
background with etiological and frequency information about cervical cancer; (3) evaluation 
of the balance of the report of effectiveness (i.e., discussion of pros and cons, concrete side 
effects and costs) and the information format (i.e., absolute or relative risk reduction 
measures); (4) the article’s tone; and (5) visualization of the content. Additionally, general 
information about the media piece (e.g., information source, media type, date, and length) was 
coded. Three coders pretested the German coding scheme on a subsample of media reports. 
The revised coding scheme was then translated into Spanish by a bilingual speaker, pretested 
on a Spanish subsample and adapted to both countries. A second Spanish coder was trained 
by a bilingual German coder to assure equivalence of the coding processes. Three 
independent coders coded the German media reports, and two independent coders did the 
Spanish media pieces. In each group, 20% of the websites were rated to assure inter-rater 
reliability by Cohen’s kappa, which revealed solid values between 0.6 and 0.7 (Grouven, 
Bender, Ziegler, & Lange, 2007).  
Results 
We summarize results for websites and newspapers separately and compare Germany 
and Spain within each media type. The three dimensions were translated into five subsections 
(see Table 1): communicators and targets, the epidemiological background, effectiveness of 
the intervention, the article’s tone, and visualization (only for websites). The dimension 
completeness refers to balanced information about cervical cancer including pros and cons of 
getting vaccinated; the dimension transparency refers to the format used to explain 
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effectiveness by relative or absolute numbers, comparative figures and visualization; the 
dimension correctness refers to all the information evaluated by the first two dimensions. Data 
about effectiveness are of central interest. A total of 1586 and 2496 newspaper reports were 
identified in Germany and Spain, respectively. Of those, 141 and 293 articles met our 
inclusion criteria. For websites, 61 and 41 reports were identified.  
Websites 
Targets and communicators. In Germany, a majority of communicators to inform on 
the HPV vaccine was represented by scientists and doctors, whereas it was nearly exclusively 
communicated by “others” (i.e., governmental sources) in Spain. Differences between 
countries were also found for the target population, even though websites in both countries 
addressed mainly laypeople. German websites differentiated more between targets and 
showed high percentages targeted for parents (90%), relatives/peers (79%), girls or young 
women (84%), and doctors (66%). In contrast, only 39% of the Spanish websites directly 
addressed parents, and only 5% addressed girls or young women.  
Epidemiological background. About two thirds of the websites provided numerical 
estimates of morbidity and mortality rates on cervical cancer (Germany: 66%; Spain: 68%); 
57% of the German and 39% of the Spanish estimates were correct. Spanish websites reported 
causes of cancer (66%) and the possibility of spontaneous recovery (68%) more often than 
German websites (52% and 38%, respectively).  
Effectiveness. Both countries’ websites rarely mentioned dysplasia risk reduction. In 
Germany, 20% reported effectiveness in terms of relative risk reduction (10% gave correct 
estimates), and 5% as absolute risk reduction. In Spain, risk reduction was reported only in 
5% of website reports (2% gave correct estimates). Reporting was similarly low for absolute 
risk reduction, prevention potential, and statements that the efficacy against cancer would be 
unclear. Cost estimates were rarely mentioned (Germany: 28%; Spain: 22%), only a few 
German websites compared the vaccination costs to cost estimates of other vaccines (8%). 
About two thirds of German websites explicitly recommended the vaccine (compared to 17% 
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of Spanish websites). In neither country did all the websites provide a reference to the 
Papanicolaou test for cancer screening (Germany: 61%; Spain: 73%). In general, German 
websites were more balanced (52% discussed both pros and cons; Spain: 37%), and half of 
them reported concrete side effects (30% as numerical estimates). One third of the Spanish 
websites included information about concrete side effects (all in numerical estimates), but 
predominantly as isolated positive proof of the vaccine’s harmlessness as compared to other 
common vaccines (e.g., hepatitis).  
Tone. We found two major differences between countries: Firstly, 41% of the Spanish 
websites compared with 64% of the German websites advertised the vaccine. Secondly, a 
majority of the Spanish websites (80%) primarily aimed at explaining the vaccine compared 
with only half of the German websites.  
 Visualization. Visualization was not very frequent on websites promoting the HPV 
vaccine. A few German websites (8%) provided visual material for the efficacy of the 
vaccine, but none of the Spanish websites did.  
Newspapers 
Targets and communicators. Looking at the newspapers, we found they were similar 
to the websites in terms of who was providing information. A majority of scientists and 
doctors represented communicators who informed about the vaccine in Germany (78% and 
55%) in contrast with Spain (21% and 32%). In both countries, “others” also represented 
communicators in about half of all reports. Newspapers in both countries addressed mainly 
laypeople. German newspapers showed a greater variety in targets, resulting in high 
percentages for parents, relatives/peers, and girls or young women. Only 19% of Spanish 
newspapers addressed parents.  
  Epidemiological background. In both countries, about half of the newspaper reports 
(Germany: 54%; Spain: 45%) provided morbidity and mortality rates, and only half of these 
reports were correct in Spain (Germany: 43%; Spain: 20%). Both countries showed low 
percentages on the comparison to other diseases and spontaneous recovery (between 12% and 
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13%). Articles in Germany and Spain covered causes of cancer in 38% and 31% of the cases, 
respectively.  
Effectiveness. Similar to websites, newspapers rarely communicated numbers for risk 
reduction in either country. Only German newspapers provided relative risk reduction (11%), 
with 6% providing correct numbers. Absolute risk reduction was only mentioned in 0.3% of 
the Spanish and 1% of the German articles; none of them were correct. Newspaper reports 
also lacked information about the prevention potential and statements that the effectiveness 
against cancer is unclear. Cost estimates were mentioned in 44% of the German and 66% of 
the Spanish newspapers with 6% of German and none of the Spanish newspapers comparing 
costs with cost estimates of other vaccines. One third of German newspapers but only 10% of 
Spanish newspapers explicitly recommended the vaccine. In both countries, about one third of 
the newspapers reported a reference to the Papanicolaou test for cancer screening. Reporting 
was more balanced in Germany than in Spain (i.e., in Germany, half of the newspapers 
reported pros and cons, in Spain only 17% did so). No cross-cultural differences emerged on 
the communication of concrete side effects (Germany: 14%; Spain: 11%). Still, newspapers in 
both countries provided less information than websites on most key aspects, such as baseline 
risk, cancer causes, spontaneous recovery, effectiveness, and side effects.  
Tone. Of the German newspaper reports, 28% advertised the vaccination, whereas 
17% did so in Spain. In general, reports in both countries aimed at explaining the vaccine or 
vaccination programs (72% for both countries).  
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Table 1 
Comparison of Internet and Newspaper Reporting on the HPV Vaccine in Germany and Spain. 
  Website reports Newspaper reports 
  
Germany Spain Germany Spain 
(N=61) (N=41) (N=141) (N=293) 
% (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) 
Communicatorsa 
   Scientists 84% (51) 10% (4) 78% (110) 21% (62) 
   Doctors 70% (43) 39% (16) 55% (77) 32% (95) 
   Patient representatives 15% (9) 2% (1) 8% (11) 0% 
   Girls or young womenb 46% (28) 5% (2) 6% (9) 0% 
   Otherc 51% (31) 80% (33)c 51% (72) 44% (130) 
Target groupa 
    Laypeople in general 90% (55) 88% (36) 99% (139) 97% (284) 
    Doctors 66% (40) 41% (17) 12% (17) 1% (4) 
    Scientists 54% (33) 15% (6) 12% (17) 1% (4) 
    Parents 90% (55) 39% (16) 71% (100) 19% (56) 
    Relatives/Peers 79% (48) 22% (9) 56% (79) 1% (3) 
    Target population/girls or    
    young women 84% (51) 5% (2) 69% (97) 0.3% (1) 
    Information centre 54% (33) 0% 12% (17) 0% 
    Other 56% (34) 0% 46% (65) 0% 
Epidemiology of Cervical Cancer 
    Frequencies 66% (40) 68% (28) 54% (76) 45% (133) 
        Correct estimates 57% (35) 39% (16) 43% (61) 20% (60)d 
    Comparison to other   
    diseases 30% (18) 0% 12% (17) 13% (39) 
    Causes of cancer 52% (32) 66% (27) 38% (54) 31% (90) 
    Spontaneous recovery 38% (23) 68% (28) 13% (18) 12% (36) 
Effectiveness 
    RRR dysplasia 20% (12) 5% (2) 11% (15) 0% 
        Correct estimates 10% (6) 2% (1) 6% (8) 0% 
    ARR dysplasia 5% (3) 0% 1% (2) 0.3% (1) 
        Correct estimates 0% 0% 0% 0% 
    Prevention potential 2% (1) 2% (1) 0% 1% (4) 
        Correct estimates 2% (1) 2% (1) 0% 0% 
    Efficacy against cancer  
    unclear 13% (8) 0% 0% 0% 
    Cost estimates 28% (17) 22% (9) 44% (62) 66% (193) 
    Comparison to other cost  
    estimates 8% (5) 0% 6% (8) 0% 
    Explicit recommendation to    
    get vaccinated 66% (40) 17% (7) 29% (41) 10% (30) 
(continued) 
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Table 1. 
 Comparison of Internet and Newspaper Reporting on the HPV Vaccine in Germany and Spain 
(continued). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations:   RRR,   relative   risk   reduction;   ARR,   absolute   risk   reduction;   Pap,   Papanicolaou   test.  
a Multiple   rankings   for   these   categories   were   possible.  
b The   category   “girls   and   or   young   women”   refers   to   testimonials   of   this   group   only   and   not   to   self-
reports   or   blog   contents. 
 c The   high   percentage   in   the   category   “others”   reflects   the   amount   of   governmental   communicators   in   
websites   that   provided   information   about   the   vaccine. 
 d This   difference   is   in   part   due   to   the   fact   that   Spanish   newspapers   often   reported   numbers   without   
reference   to   the   base   rate   and   age   standardization   of   the   specific Spanish   communities   or   the   country   of   
Spain,   respectively.  
e As   LexisNexis   does   not   allow   to   map   visualization   only   websites   were   evaluated   in   this   category.  
 
Discussion 
We sought to evaluate media coverage of the HPV vaccine. We compared two media 
sources—Internet websites and newspapers—in two countries with different health systems—
Germany and Spain. The three evaluation dimensions—completeness, transparency, and 
correctness—revealed shortcomings in both countries and both media types. In Germany, 
about half of the websites communicated correct epidemiological information and causes of 
cancer, but only one third mentioned spontaneous recovery. In Spain, websites mentioned 
  Website reports Newspaper reports 
  
Germany Spain Germany Spain 
(N=61) (N=41) (N=141) (N=293) 
% (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) 
    Reference to Pap screening 61% (37) 73% (30) 36% (51) 33% (97)  
    Pros and cons  52% (32) 37% (15) 50% (70) 17% (49) 
    Concrete side effects 48% (29) 32% (13) 14% (20) 11% (33) 
        Numerical estimates 30% (18) 32% (13) 7% (10) 5% (16) 
    Article’s tonea 
    Advertising 64% (39) 41% (17) 28% (39) 17% (50) 
    Explaining 51% (31) 80% (33) 72% (101) 72% (210) 
    Warning 3% (2) 0% 5% (7) 14% (21) 
    Other 3% (2) 5% (2) 4% (5) 39% (113) 
Visualizatione 
    Epidemiology/Frequency 10% (6) 5% (2)   
    Effectiveness 8% (5) 0%   
    Biology/Virus/Anatomy 11% (7) 17% (7)   
    Pictures (i.e. photos) 21% (13) 29% (12)   
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spontaneous recovery more often, but epidemiological information was less frequently 
correct. In general, newspapers documented epidemiological, etiological, and pathological 
information less often than websites. According to our evaluation criteria, both media types in 
both countries failed to provide correct and transparent information about effectiveness—with 
Germany showing slightly higher proportions of correctness and transparency.  
Despite the limited evidence regarding the vaccine’s evaluation (e.g., duration of 
protection1), only German websites (13%) explicitly referred to the scientific uncertainty of 
the vaccine, stating that efficacy against cancer is still unclear. Half of the websites and 
newspaper reports discussed pros and cons in Germany; this was less common in Spanish 
reports (37% and 17%, respectively). Websites reported side effects more often than 
newspapers. In both countries, only one third of newspaper reports referred to the 
Papanicolaou test, but the majority of websites did so. On the other hand, newspaper reports 
in both countries provided cost estimates more frequently than websites. Target groups of 
most reports were laypeople. While the majority of reports had an expository tone, more than 
half of the German websites had an advertising tone and two thirds explicitly recommended 
the vaccine. Websites in both countries used visualization rarely, and if so, illustrations 
seldom seem intended to facilitate understanding of risk information (e.g., icon arrays).  
Although differences between media types were not analyzed, potential disparities 
may be due to the target population: Websites may inform girls and parents and therefore 
include epidemiological and etiological information, side effects, and references to 
Papanicolaou screening. Newspapers may target the broader public, providing less 
background information but discussing cost estimates more frequently. The greater number of 
governmental and ministerial communicators on Spanish websites may be due to differences 
between the health care systems: the national health care system in Spain is centrally 
organized, with systematic school-based vaccination programs. In Germany, the system is 
organized in a more decentralized, self-administered way and vaccination is offered 
opportunistically. This communication style may lead to a more directive, less informative, 
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and, finally, less participative health care system. Fewer demands for and less active interest 
in transparent, balanced media reporting by Spanish citizens could be a result. Future research 
should address these hypotheses in more detail and further investigate the effects of different 
health systems on public health decisions.  
These descriptive results may be limited by a rather hypothesis-generating than 
hypothesis-testing approach for identifying differences in media coverage between media 
sources and countries. The LexisNexis search and the identification criteria for websites, 
however, reflect a representative sample of current media coverage. Differences between 
media types may have occurred because of the different timeframes of our literature search 
(newspapers: March 2007–June 2009; websites: January 2009–May 2009), but no differences 
were found in newspaper coverage before and after general vaccine criticism arose in 2008 
(Dören et al., 2008), 2009 (Gerhardus, Dören, & Gerlach, 2009), or 2010 (Gerhardus & 
Razum, 2010). We intentionally restricted our Internet search to health authorities, since 
public health websites and university websites scored highest on credibility, accessibility, 
content, and design (Tozzi et al., 2010).  
As noted earlier, the media can influence health attitudes and behavior. While health 
communications often are intended to persuade or nudge people (Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, 
Suhrcke, & Kelly, 2011), an alternative communication strategy takes an informative, 
nondirective approach that centers on transparency and (gained) knowledge (Feufel & 
Bodemer, 2012). The goal is to equip patients with sufficient knowledge to make individual, 
informed decisions—the basis for informed consent and shared decision making. The media 
can be one source for independent and transparent health information. In line with other 
researchers, we suggest that fact boxes can provide all the relevant information (Schwartz et 
al., 2009). One might argue that the fact box presented here is too complex and detailed—but 
it allows each individual to select the information needed to make a personal decision. 
Furthermore, health professionals and journalists can benefit from facts boxes to 
communicate key aspects of treatment effectiveness and shortcomings.  
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Standards for media coverage of health issues 
• Explain goal of medical treatment or prevention (i.e., primary vs. 
secondary prevention programs) 
• Define target population  
• Explain etiology (i.e., causes of cancer, possibility of spontaneous 
recovery) so that underlying hypotheses for the development of new 
treatment or prevention options can be understood 
• Provide epidemiological data (i.e., number of incidences and number 
of deaths) to convey an idea of baseline risk 
• Communicate treatment effects in absolute numbers (i.e., absolute risk 
reduction). Additionally, communicate side effects in absolute 
numbers (i.e., risk increase, false positives) to convey information for 
shared decision making 
• Include visualizations to illustrate treatment effects to address a wide 
range of people (also those with limited numeracy skills) 
• Communicate cost estimates to convey an idea of individual and public 
health investments in view of limited individual public resources 
• Mention alternatives to treatment 
• Use comparative figures (i.e., effects of other well-established 
prevention programs, overall cancer mortality, costs of other well-
known interventions, etc.)  
• Disclose uncertainties and what is not (yet) known (i.e., duration of 
immunization, effects on cancer since only surrogate measures are 
available, etc.) 
• Disclose conflicts of interests 
To improve future media coverage, reporting standards—such as CONSORT (2011) 
or STROBE (2011)—should be developed, with equal access for journalists, public health 
policy makers, health care professionals, and citizens. Standards will help consumers identify 
reliable and balanced information sources and will support the use of transparent formats to 
translate scientific knowledge. Based on current research about risk communication and 
concepts of minimal statistical literacy and criteria for evidence-based patient information, we 
propose standards for media coverage (Figure 1). Similar to the International Patient Decision 
Aid Standards (Elwyn et al., 2006; Holmes-Rovner, 2007), our standards may help further 
people’s involvement in and knowledge about health decisions (O’Connor et al., 2001).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed standards for transparent online and offline information about health interventions.  
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Appendix A 
German institutions include the following: Bundesministeriums für Gesundheit (BMG); 
Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung; Robert-Koch-Institut; Paul-Ehrlich-Institut; 
Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss; Krankenkassen und deren Bundesverbände; 
Bundesärztekammer und alle Landesärztekammern; Landesgesundheitsministerien und 
Landesgesundheitsämter; Bundesbeauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der 
Patientinnen und Patienten; Deutsches Krebsforschungsinstitut; Gynäkologische und 
Pädiatrische Fachgesellschafte; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Epidemiologie; Deutsches 
Netzwerk Evidenzbasierte Medizin; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sozialmedizin und Prävention; 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Medizinische Informatik, Biometrie und Epidemiologie; 
Krebsfachgesellschaften, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der wissenschaftlichen medizinischen 
Fachgesellschaften; Pro Familia; Selbsthilfe Kontakt und Information Stelle (SEKIS); 
Nationale Kontakt- und Informationsstelle zur Anregung und Unterstützung von 
Selbsthilfegruppen (NAKOS); “www.patienteninformation.de” von Bundesärztekammer und 
Kassenärztlicher Bundesvereinigung; “www.akdae.de” der Arzneimittelkommission der 
deutschen Ärzteschaft, Techniker Krankenkasse und BMG; “www.gesundheitsinformation.de” 
Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen; Sanofi Pasteur; Merck & 
Co.; “www.zervita.de” (Zervita) 
 
Spanish institutions include the following: Accudes; Adeslas; Ampligen; Asisa; Asociación 
Española Contra el Cáncer; Asociación Española de Patología Cervical y Colposcopia; 
Comunidad Castilla de la Mancha; Comunidad Foral de Navarra; Comunidad de Madrid 
Consejería de Sanidad; Comunidad de Madrid; Consellería de Sanitat Valencia; DVK 
Seguros; Fisterra- Lorena Anido Redondo (GP); Generalitat de Catalunia; GlaxoSmithKline; 
Gobierno de Aragón; Gobierno de Canarias; Gobierno de Asturias; Gobierno de Murcia; 
Govern de Illes Balears; Gobierno de la Rioja; Gobierno Salud de la Rioja; Gobierno Vasco; 
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Junta Castilla y León; Junta de Andalucía; Junta de Galicia; Labec Pharma; Mapfre 
Seguros; Ministerio de Sanidad y Política Social; Sanidad Asturiana; Sanidad Murciana; 
Sanidad Vasca; Sanitas; Sanofi Pasteur MSD; Sociedad Aragonesa de Medicina Familiar y 
Comunitaria; Sociedad Española de Contracepción; Sociedad Española de Ginecología y 
Obstetricia; Sociedad Española de Medicina General; Sociedad Española de Medicina 
Familiar y Comunitaria; Sociedad Española de Medicina Rural y Generalista; Asociación 
Española de Pediatría de Atención Primaria; Sociedad Española de Salud Pública y 
Administración Sanitaria; Sociedad Navarra de Medicina de Familia y Atención Primaria; 
Sociedad de Pediatría de Atención Primaria de Extremadura; Societat Valenciana de 
Medicina Familiar y Comunitaria 
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Appendix B 
 
 Search string for LexisNexis search on HPV vaccination 
German 
(hpv! OR papillom! OR kondylom! OR condylom! OR dna-vir! OR hp-vir! OR 
genitalwarz! OR warzenvir! OR gebärmutterhalsk! OR gebärmutterhalst!) AND 
(impf! OR vakzin! OR immunisierung OR protektiv OR protektion OR prävention 
OR vorbeugung OR gardasil OR sanofi pasteur OR cervarix OR zervarix OR glaxo 
smithkline OR silgard OR merck) 
Spanish 
(hpv! OR papiloma humano! OR condiloma! OR ph-vir! OR verrugas en el pene! 
OR condiloma acuminata! OR verrugas venéreas! OR cáncer cervical! OR cuello de 
útero! OR cáncer de cuello uterino! OR neoplasia cervical intraepitelial! OR) AND 
(vacuna! OR papanicolaou! OR frotis de pap! OR inmunización OR proteción OR 
prevención OR gardasil OR sanofi pasteur OR cervarix OR glaxo smithkline OR 
silgard OR merck) 
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Appendix C 
Facts box summarizing evidence for information about cervical cancer and the HPV vaccine 
(Gardasil). The facts box is based on scientific evidence (May 2009) and served as baseline 
comparison for the evaluation of media reports of German and Spanish websites and 
newspapers. A coding scheme was developed including all information displayed in the facts 
box. 
Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination with Gardasil 
What is the aim of the vaccine?1,2 Preventing the infection with HPV type 16 and 18 to decrease the risk of 
cervical cancer; additional protection against genital warts 
How is HPV transmitted?1,2 By sexual contact 
What are the consequences of an 
infection?3-6 
Infections with potentially 18 different types of HPV over decades can 
lead to changes in the tissue, which may (1) cause preliminary stages of 
cancer in the cervix, which may develop into (2) cervical cancer. Seventy 
of 100 cases of cervical cancer are due to HPV 16/18. 
How prevalent is cervical cancer?  
 
In 100,000 women per year In all women per year 
  Germany7 Spain8 Germany7 Spain8 
Deaths Cervical cancer 3 2.5 1,500 718 
 All types of cancer 230 236 101,000 6,565 
Incidence Cervical cancer 15 7.6 6,200 1,965 
 All types of cancer 500 450 200,000 121,176 
Is there a chance that the infection will 
disappear without treatment?3,5,6 
Yes. For orientation, there is spontaneous recovery in over 90 of 
100 cases for infections and in 50 of 100 cases for preliminary 
stages of cancer. 
For whom is it recommended and 
covered by public insurance?1,2 
Girls 12–17 years (Germany) and 11–14 years (Spain), preferably 
before any first sexual contact. Some Spanish communities also 
recommend vaccination for girls 9–15 years. 
How long does the vaccine last?1,2 Minimum 5 years. 
Are there other types of HPV that could 
increase and/or decrease after the 
vaccination?1 
Due to theoretical assumptions potentially yes. This is called 
replacement and cross protection. 
Are there other preventive methods?1,9 Yes. Early detection with Papanicolaou/Pap test “for woman aged 
20 years and older” (Germany) or “between 15 and 25 until 49–65 
years” (Spain, differing by community), which should also be 
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applied for vaccinated women. Use of condoms. 
How effective was Gardasil in scientific studies?10-12* 
 Of 1,000 women 
Incidence of risky, preliminary stages of cervical cancer (due to all HPV 
viruses) Vaccinated Not vaccinated 
At the beginning of the study, all participants had not been infected with the 
types of HPV that are covered by the vaccine/all were virgins10 20 28 
All participants (at the beginning of the study infection with HPV possible)10-
12 42 49 
Incidence of cervical cancer12 Not clear, no scientific 
evidence 
Are there side effects of Gardasil? (based on the European release)12-14 
Very frequent – frequent 
>1,000 – ≥10,000 of 100,000 
Occasional – rare 
10 – 1,000 of 100,000 
Very rare 
< 10 of 100,000 
- fever; injection site: redness, pain,  
 swelling, effusion, itching 
 
- unspecific arthritis, joint trouble 
- severe allergic reaction, 
urticaria 
- bronchoconstriction with severe 
shortness of breath  
On the basis of spontaneous reports after the release of the vaccine (size and estimated number of unreported 
cases is unclear). These reports are in temporal relation to the vaccine; it is unclear whether the vaccine caused 
these incidences.  
- serious neurological illness (Guillain-Barré-Syndrom), signs of paralysis, paralysis of the face, seizure 
- vomiting, muscle pain, lymphadenopathy, allergic reaction 
- sporadic cases of death  
What are the vaccination costs? 
 Germany15-17 Spain18,19 
Costs for one complete vaccination 465 euros 465 euros 
Total cost for one cohort of girls  about 200 million 
euros 
about 63 million 
euros 
Total cost of all annual public health programs (for all diseases) about 1883 million 
euros 
About 946 million 
euros 
1. Robert Koch Institut/ RKI (2007) Mitteilung der Ständigen Impfkommission/ STIKO am RKI (Stand: März 2007). Epid 
Bull 12: 97-103 
2. Robert Koch Institut/ RKI (2010):  Empfehlungen der Ständigen Impfkommission/ STIKO am RKI/Stand Juli 2010. 
Epid Bull 30: 235–250 
3. Wentzensen N, Klug S J (2009) Früherkennung des Zervixkarzinoms: Suche nach einem Gesamtkonzept. Dtsch Arztebl 
105: 617-622  
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4. Munoz N, Bosch X, de Sanjose S et al. (2003) Epidemiologic classification of Human Papillomavirus Types associated 
with cervical cancer. N Engl J Med 348(6): 518-527 
5. Schiffman M (2007) Integration of human papillomavirus vaccination, cytology, and human papillomavirus testing. 
Cancer 111:145–53 
6. Ostor A G (1993) Natural history of cervical intraepithelial neoplasia: a critical review. Int J Gynecol Pathol 12:186–192 
7. Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes (2009). http://www.destatis.de 
8. Ferlay J, Parkin D M, Steliarova-Foucher E.. Estimates of cancer incidence and mortality in Europe in 2008. Eur J 
Cancer 2010;46:765–81. 
9. Winer R L, Hughes J P, Feng Q, O’Reilly S, Kiviat M B, Holmes K K, Koutsky L A (2006) Condom use and the risk of 
genital human Papillomavirus infection in young women. N Engl J Med, 354(25): 2645-2654 
10. FUTURE II Study Grp (2007) Quadrivalent vaccine against human papillomavirus to prevent high-grade cervical 
lesions. N. Engl. J. Med. 356: 1915-1927 
11. FUTURE I investigators (2007) Quadrivalent vaccine against human papillomavirus to prevent anogenital diseases. N. 
Engl. J. Med. 356:1928-1943 
12. European Medicine Agency/ EMA (2008) Europ. Beurteilungsbericht (EPAR) GARDASIL (31/10/2008 Gardasil-H-C-
703- II-13). 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/medicines/human/medicines/000703/human_med_000805.jsp&mi
d=WC0b01ac058001d125&murl=menus/medicines/medicines.jsp und 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/EPAR_-
_Procedural_steps_taken_and_scientific_information_after_authorisation/human/000703/WC500021147.pdf 
13. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2008) Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) 2008. 
http://www.vaers.hhs.gov/scripts/data.cfm 
14. European Medicine Agency/ EMA (2010): Gardasil: EPAR – Summary for the public (14/09/2010)  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/EPAR_-
_Summary_for_the_public/human/000703/WC500021146.pdf und 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/EPAR_-
_Procedural_steps_taken_and_scientific_information_after_authorisation/human/000703/WC500021147.pdf 
15. a-t (Arznei-Telegramm) (2008) 1997 und 2007 im Vergleich - die Umsatzstärksten Arzneimittel. a-t 39:65-66  
16. Rosenbrock R (2007) HPV-Impfung - Durchbruch in der Krebsprävention? http://www.forum-
gesundheitspolitik.de/artikel/artikel.pl?artikel=0644 oder http://www.forum-
gesundheitspolitik.de/dossier/PDF/Rosenbrock-HPV-Impfung.pdf 
17. OECD (2011) Dataset System of Health Accounts, Country Germany 
http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3746,en_33873108_33873402_33884311_1_1_1_1,00.html 
18. OECD (2011) Dataset Dataset System of health Accounts, Country Spain 
http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,3343,en_2649_33929_33884753_1_1_1_1,00.html 
19. Lopez Alemany J M, Cortes Bordoy J, Gil de Miguel A. Human papilomavirus tetravalent vaccine cost-effectiveness 
study. Rev Esp Econ Salud 2007;6: 400-8. 
 
*The numbers of the first effectiveness data can be found on page 1922, 2nd paragraph, in the Future II-study; this result 
corresponds to the a-priori defined „unrestricted susceptible population“ which is similar to the combined analyses of the 
Future I- and Future II-studies of the “modified intention-to-treat-analyses” (MITT-2) in the EMA report 2008 on page 22 in 
table 15.12 The numbers of the 2nd effectiveness data can be found on page 22, last paragraph, and in table 15 as the a-priori 
defined “MITT-3”-analysis; it is also a combined analysis of the Future I- and Future II-studies.12 
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Abstract 
Relative risk reductions, a standard format for communicating treatment benefits in 
medical journals, decision aids, and patient brochures, are often misunderstood by both 
doctors and patients. To resolve this problem, one suggestion is to include the baseline risk in 
such communications. Four experiments examined (1) whether the presentation format 
(frequency vs. percentage) of the baseline risk matters for people’s understanding of relative 
risk reductions and increases, and (2) whether this effect is different for low and high 
numerates. The experiments showed that relative risk reductions (increases) were often 
misunderstood as absolute risk reductions (increases), when the baseline risk was presented in 
a percentage format. For relative risk reductions, this misunderstanding led to an 
overestimation of actual treatment benefits; for relative risk increases, it led to an 
overestimation of treatment harms. Moreover, many participants ignored the baseline risk 
entirely or made calculation errors. Communicating baseline risk through frequency 
information particularly helped low numerates to correctly understand relative risk reductions 
(increases); high numerates interpreted relative risk statements mostly correctly, independent 
of format. Nevertheless, even a frequency format led a substantial proportion of participants 
to misinterpret the risk. If relative risk reductions and increases are used for communicating 
treatment benefits and harms, baseline risk should thus be provided in a frequency format. 
However, the findings suggest rethinking the use of relative risks in practice. 
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Introduction 
Mammography screening reduces breast cancer mortality by 20% in women aged 50 
and older. Certain drugs that lower cholesterol levels promise to cut the risk of stroke by 48% 
in patients with risk factors. In 1995, the UK Committee on Safety for Medicine released a 
warning that the third generation of the oral contraceptive pill increased the risk of life-
threatening blood clots in legs or lungs by 100%, compared with the second generation pill.  
What do these seemingly impressive numbers actually mean? The mammography 
screening and the cholesterol-lowering drug example communicate the benefit of a treatment 
in terms of a relative risk reduction; the contraceptive pill example states the potential harm of 
a treatment as a relative risk increase. A relative risk reduction (RRR) is defined as the 
difference in event rates (risk) in the control and treatment group, normalized by the event 
rate in the control group (the baseline risk) (Table 1). For instance, the 20% relative risk 
reduction of breast cancer mortality when participating in mammography screening is derived 
from the finding that 5 in 1,000 women aged 50 and older will die from breast cancer without 
screening, as opposed to 4 in 1,000 when participating in screening (Gøtzsche & Nielsen, 
2006). Out of 100 patients with risk factors for stroke, 2.8 experience a stroke without taking 
a certain statin, while 1.5 who do take the drug experience a stroke or similar events 
(Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007). A relative risk 
increase (RRI) is defined analogously (Table 1). In the contraceptive pill example, the risk of 
thrombosis increased from 1 out of 7,000 women taking the second-generation pill to 2 out of 
7,000 women taking the third-generation pill—a relative risk increase of 100% (Gigerenzer & 
Gray, 2011; Williams, Kelly, Carvalho, & Feely, 1998). 
 An alternative way to express the same information is an absolute risk reduction, or 
absolute risk increase: the arithmetic difference between the event in a control group (baseline 
risk) and a treatment group (Table 1). In the mammography screening example, the absolute 
risk reduction would be 1 in 1,000 or, expressed in terms of percentages, 0.1% 
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(0.5% − 0.4%). The advantage of this measure—in contrast to a relative risk reduction—is 
that it also considers the total number of people at risk. For instance, a relative risk reduction 
of 50% may refer to a decrease from 2 in 10 in the control group to 1 in 10 in the treatment 
group, but it could also refer to a reduction from 2 in 1,000 to 1 in 1,000. By contrast, the 
absolute risk reduction reflects the difference between the two scenarios, being 10% in the 
former case, but 0.1% in the latter case. 
Table 1 
Relative and Absolute Risk Formats. The Example For the Risk Reductions Is Based on the 
Mammography Example (Mortality Reduction From 5 in 1,000 to 4 in 1,000 When Participating in 
Screening). The Example For the Risk Increase Measures Is Based on the “Pill Scare” (Increase of 
Thrombosis From 1 in 7,000 to 2 in 7,000 When Taking the Third-Generation Contraceptive Pill). 
 
Note. ERControl  =  event rate in the control group (baseline risk); ERTreatment  = event rate in the treatment group.  
 
How relative vs. absolute risk reductions influence risk perception and decision making 
Relative and absolute risks are based on the same statistical information (Table 1). 
However, the format in which treatment benefits and harms are communicated influences the 
evaluation of medical treatments. In general, treatment benefits presented as relative risk 
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reductions are more favorably evaluated than when presented as absolute risk reductions (e.g., 
Akl et al., 2011; Covey, 2007; Edwards Elwyn, Covey, Matthews, & Pill, 2001). For instance, 
in a survey regarding the willingness to participate in a fictitious cancer screening, 80% of 
participants were willing to participate when the treatment’s benefits were presented in terms 
of a relative risk reduction. Only 53%, however, were willing to participate when presenting 
the screening’s benefit in terms of an absolute risk reduction (Sarfati, Howden-Chapman, 
Woodward, & Salmond, 1998). When choosing between two equivalent treatments whose 
benefits were communicated in terms of either a relative or an absolute risk reduction, the 
majority of participants preferred the treatment whose benefits were presented as relative risk 
reduction (Malenka, Baron, Johansen, Wahrenberger, & Ross, 1993). Such findings are not 
limited to laypeople, but have also been observed with health professionals (Cranney & 
Walley, 1996; Forrow, Taylor, & Arnold, 1992; Mühlhauser, Kasper, Meyer, & Federation of 
European Nurses in Diabetes, 2006).  
The negative consequences of using relative risk formats have been observed outside 
the lab as well. For instance, in 1995 empirical data from England and Wales showed a steep 
increase in the number of abortions, although this number had been on the decline since 1990. 
The rise was attributed to a decreased use of the contraceptive pill, resulting from the above-
mentioned warning about the third-generation contraceptive pill (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011; 
Williams et al., 1998).  
Including baseline risk to improve understanding of relative risk reductions  
Despite these findings, relative risk reductions remain the predominant format for 
communicating treatment benefits, be it in direct-to-consumer advertisements, brochures, and 
websites (Jorgensen & Gøtzsche, 2004; Moynihan, Bero, Ross-Degnan, Henry, Lee, et al., 
2000; Slaytor & Ward, 1998) or within the medical community (Gigerenzer, Wegwarth, & 
Feufel, 2011; Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch, 2006; Sedrakyan & Shih, 2007). 
Why is that? First, health organizations like the Cochrane Collaboration still promote 
relative risk reductions, which may also explain why leading medical journals predominantly 
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provide them in their abstracts (Gigerenzer, Wegwarth, & Feufel, 2011; Sedrakyan & Shih, 
2007). Although the use of absolute risk reductions is recommended in the “Summary of 
Findings” in the 2009 Cochrane Handbook (Higgins & Green, 2009), relative risk reductions 
“remain crucial because relative effects tend to be substantially more stable across risk groups 
than absolute risks” (Higgins & Green, 2009, p. 12-13). At the same time, omitting baseline 
risk is a major weakness; without this information one cannot make sense of the actual risk 
reduction.  
This leads to the second argument for using relative risk reductions: Differences in the 
misperception of relative risk reductions are supposed to diminish when the baseline risk is 
also provided. Natter and Berry (2005) gave participants information about the risk reduction 
in a fictitious flu scenario, either in terms of relative or absolute risk reduction. Omitting 
baseline risk led to an overestimation of event rates regarding both the baseline risk in the 
population and the (reduced) risk in the treatment group. When people received information 
about the baseline risk, their estimates of treatment efficiency were more accurate. Schwartz, 
Woloshin, Black, and Welch (1997) asked women to estimate how many out of 1,000 women 
with and without mammography screening would die from breast cancer. Participants 
received the risk reduction either in relative or absolute terms. Including baseline risk 
improved accuracy for relative and absolute risk reductions alike. Yet at least two thirds of the 
participants were still incapable of giving the correct estimate, even when provided with 
baseline risk. In particular, participants with low numeracy abilities had major difficulties in 
solving the task.  
Baseline risk: When and whom does it help? 
The objective of our paper is to better understand how the inclusion of baseline risk 
helps people to interpret relative risk reductions correctly. Both Natter and Berry's (2005) and 
Schwartz and colleagues' (2007) studies focused on the effects of providing versus not 
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providing baseline risks. We extend prior research by identifying determinants and limitations 
for correctly interpreting relative risk reductions (or relative risk increases) when baseline risk 
is included. More specifically, we focus on two questions: (1) When including baseline risk to 
communicate relative risk information, does the presentation format of the baseline risk 
matter for understanding its meaning? (2) Does low and high numerates’ understanding of 
relative risk information differ according to the presentation format of the baseline risk?  
Risk communication and the role of the presentation format 
The mathematical definition of a relative risk reduction is unambiguous. But is the 
perception and interpretation of it just as clear-cut? For instance, one explanation for the so-
called “conjunction fallacy” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) is that the mathematical and 
logical definition of concepts like “probability” and (the logical) “and” have been interpreted 
differently in everyday contexts (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). A similar argument can be 
made with respect to relative risk reductions. For example, in 2009 about 35% of men aged 35 
and older with diabetes in the US had heart disease or a stroke (CDC, 2011). Imagine a drug 
that reduces the risk of stroke in people with diabetes by 25% (Collins et al., 2004). What 
percentage of diabetics who take the drug will have heart disease?1 The difficulty in making 
this inference lies in the potential ambiguity of the term “reduced by.” What is meant is a 
relative risk reduction, implying that the event rate is reduced from 35% to 26.25%. However, 
an alternative (erroneous) interpretation is to consider the 25% reduction as referring to an 
absolute risk reduction. In that case, the risk reduction would refer to a decrease in 25 
percentage points, meaning that the risk for heart disease is reduced from 35% to 10% when 
taking the drug. Thus, interpreting a relative risk reduction as an absolute risk reduction 
would lead to a gross overestimation of the treatment‘s effectiveness (26% vs. 10%).  
                                                             
1 For illustrative purposes, we here assume that of the 35% of diabetics who had a stroke, nobody had received 
the drug. Furthermore, we assume that the drug is assumed to be equally effective for different risk factors. 
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The same argument can be made for interpretations of relative risk increase. Imagine 
that a certain treatment increases the risk of an undesirable side-effect by 25%, relative to a 
35% baseline risk in a control group. The intended interpretation would imply an event rate of 
43.75% in the treatment group. By contrast, erroneously interpreting the information as an 
absolute risk increase (i.e., an increase in percentage points) would yield an event rate of 60% 
in the treatment group—a strong overestimation of the actual risk. 
While in the above example the baseline risk of stroke in diabetes patients without the 
drug was presented in percentage format (35% of the patients), one could also present the 
same information in frequency format: 350 out of 1,000 patients with diabetes experienced a 
stroke. Previous research found that people’s capacity to reason with quantitative information 
depends on the external presentation format, for example whether information is provided in 
terms of probabilities or natural frequencies (Brase, 2008; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Galesic, 
Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). When interpretating 
relative risk reductions with baseline risk, people’s reasoning processes might be affected by 
the presentation format of the baseline risk. We hypothesize that one means of reducing the 
ambiguity in relative risk statements is to present the baseline risk in terms of frequencies 
(i.e., 350 out of 1,000). First, people often have difficulties in performing mathematical 
operations with percentages (Moser, 2002; Schwartz & Woloshin, 2000). Second, when 
baseline risk is presented as a frequency, it is not possible to directly subtract the risk 
reduction from the baseline value, as one must either convert the risk reduction into 
frequencies or the baseline risk into percentages. This may increase comprehension of the 
information by resolving potential ambiguity, either by clarifying the relevant reference class 
or by simplifying the computation (e.g., if the risk reduction is 20%, it may be easier to 
compute 20% of 300 than 20% of 30%).  
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The role of numeracy 
Individual differences in the ability to comprehend and use numerical information 
affect how people understand relative risk reductions (Peters, 2008). The terms statistical 
literacy (Gigerenzer et al., 2007) and numeracy (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann., 2009) 
have been coined to define basic requirements for understanding numerical information. In 
general, the public—but also health professionals—are often described as being statistically 
illiterate, lacking the requisite skills for appropriately understanding statistical information 
(Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Reyna et al., 2009). Numeracy is 
also an important moderator in risk perception and decision making, with high numerates 
being more precise in their numerical interpretation and less prone to framing effects (Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Peters Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert, 2006). In 
line with the findings from Schwartz and colleagues (1997; see also Peters, 2008) regarding 
numeracy and the interpretation of relative risk reductions, we hypothesize that low numerates 
in particular might confuse relative risk reductions with absolute risk reductions.  
 Note that terms like innumeracy do not necessarily suggest a hard-wired incapacity to 
reason with numerical information. Rather, this capacity also depends on the presentation 
format that is used. For example, it has been argued that people perform better in solving 
Bayesian tasks when information is presented in natural frequencies compared with 
conditional probabilities (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), because 
natural frequencies more closely correspond to their experiences in the natural world (in 
which non-normalized frequency information is the “raw data”). Thus, finding ways to 
communicate information in a way that fosters people’s understanding of statistical 
information is an important factor in risk communication. 
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Experiment 1a 
The objective of Experiment 1 was to examine the conditions under which people 
correctly understand the meaning of a relative risk reduction (RRR interpretation) when the 
baseline risk is also provided. Specifically, our goal was to find out whether and when a 
relative risk reduction may be erroneously interpreted as an absolute risk reduction (ARR 
interpretation). Participants were presented with a fictitious medical scenario and a risk 
reduction statement similar to those commonly used in communicating medical information 
(e.g., “The drug reduces the risk by 20%”), together with information on the baseline risk. We 
hypothesized that such a risk statement is more likely to be erroneously interpreted as an 
absolute risk reduction—rather than a relative risk reduction—(i) when the baseline risk is 
presented in a percentage format and (ii) by people with low numeracy skills. By contrast, 
presenting baseline risk in terms of frequencies should increase the proportion of both low 
and high numerates who interpret the statement as referring to a relative risk decrease. A final 
goal of Experiment 1 was to identify participants’ reasoning processes by asking them to 
describe how they arrived at their estimate.  
Method 
Participants. 101 participants (59.4% female; Mage=35, SD=11.5) were recruited 
through Amazon’s MTurk for an online study; remuneration was $0.75. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two baseline risk conditions {percentage vs. frequency}.  
Materials and Procedure. All participants were presented with the following 
hypothetical scenario: 
A study tested a new drug for diabetes. The study’s aim was to find out whether and to what extent the 
new drug reduced the risk of heart disease. To evaluate the new drug, 2,000 patients with diabetes were 
tested. The patients were randomly assigned to two groups: 1,000 patients received the new drug and 
1,000 patients received no drug. The patients receiving no drug served as a control group. After five 
years, the number of patients with heart diseases in each of the two groups was compared.  
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Subjects in the baseline percentage condition received then the following information: 
In the control group without the drug 30% of the patients had heart disease. 
The study showed that the new drug reduced the risk of heart disease by 20%. 
Please estimate how many patients in the group with the drug suffered from heart disease: 
 
O  24% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  10% out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
 
The first answer (24%) is the correct one, referring to a relative risk reduction of 20%. The 
second answer (10%) corresponds to an erroneous interpretation of the relative risk reduction 
as an absolute risk reduction.  
Subjects in the baseline frequency condition received the same information, but here 
the baseline risk was presented in frequency format: 
In the control group without the drug, 300 out of 1,000 of the patients had heart disease. 
The study showed that the new drug reduced the risk of heart disease by 20%. 
Please estimate how many patients in the group with the drug suffered from heart disease: 
 
O  240 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  100 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
 
Note that all participants received the same risk reduction statement (“The study showed 
that the new drug reduced the risk of heart disease by 20%“). The crucial difference was 
whether baseline risk was presented as percentage or frequency. The order of the two 
answers was randomized. After participants selected their answer and provided a written 
explanation of their decision, their numeracy was assessed using the 11-item numeracy 
scale from Lipkus and colleagues (2001), with the items presented in random order.    
Results and Discussion 
The results show a strong influence of presentation format on the interpretation of the 
risk reduction statement (Figure 1). In the percentage condition, only 51% (24/47) of 
participants correctly interpreted the statement as a relative risk reduction, estimating that 
Chapter 4 – Relative risk reduction (increase) with baseline risk 70 
 
24% out of 1,000 patients who did receive the drug would suffer from heart disease. The other 
half of the subjects (49%) estimated that the drug would reduce the risk of heart disease to 
10%. Thus, these participants erroneously understood the statement as an absolute risk 
reduction, thereby strongly overestimating the drug’s effectiveness.  
In stark contrast, 83% (45/51) of participants in the frequency condition assumed that 
the drug would reduce the event rate from 300 to 240, thereby correctly interpreting the 
statement as a relative risk reduction (two-tail binomial, p=.001). Thus, the frequency format 
helped people to make sound inferences regarding what the risk reduction statement implied. 
 
Figure 1. Results of Experiment 1a. In the percentage condition, the event rate in the control group 
(baseline risk) was set to 30%, in the frequency condition to 300 out of 1,000. “Total” includes all 
subjects' interpretations in the percentage and frequency condition (n=101). Low numerates are those 
with a numeracy score 
 
             
      
 
Influence of numeracy. Does people’s numeracy affect their interpretation of relative 
risk information? We conducted a median split to categorize participants as low numerates (≤ 
9 items correct) and high numerates (≥10 items correct) (cf. Peters et al., 2006; Galesic et al., 
2009). For low numerates, a strong effect of presentation format was observed (Figure 1). In 
the percentage condition, only 27% (7/26) of low numeracy participants correctly interpreted 
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the information as referring to a relative risk reduction (two-tail binomial, p = .03). By 
contrast, when baseline risk was presented in terms of frequencies, 79% (26/33) correctly 
interpreted the statement (two-tail binomial, p=.001). The inferences of the high numerates 
were only weakly affected by presentation format. In both conditions, most participants 
correctly interpreted the statement as a relative risk reduction: 84% (16/19; two-tail binomial, 
p = .004) in the percentage condition and 95% (19/20; two-tail binomial, p = .0004) in the 
frequency condition.   
The finding that only high numerates were likely to understand the health information 
in the intended way suggests that numeracy plays an important role when baseline risk is 
presented in terms of percentages. By contrast, numeracy was largely irrelevant when baseline 
risk was presented in terms of frequencies; in this case low numerates also tended to correctly 
understand the statement as a relative risk reduction.  
Reasoning analysis. The final analysis concerns participants’ written descriptions of 
their reasoning processes. Answers were coded according to four categories: (1) Did the 
participant explicitly refer to a numerical calculation to justify the selected answer 
(“calculation”)? For example, a participant selecting an RRR interpretation might explicitly 
state that 24% = 30% - (30% × 0.2) or 30% × 0.8. Conversely, a participant making an ARR 
interpretation might report 10% = 30% - 20%. (2) Did a participant use a mental short cut to 
justify the selected answer? For example, a participant stated: “I am bad at math; however, 
10% seems way too low of a number compared to 24%.” Hence, one might compare the two 
answer options and select the one that intuitively appears more plausible. (3) Did the 
participant guess? Some subjects explicitly indicated that they simply guessed which answer 
might be correct. (4) A fourth category subsumes participants whose reasoning was not 
identifiable (“not identified”).  
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Table 2 shows the results of this analysis. Most participants who made an RRR 
interpretation explicitly noted the corresponding calculation (78% in the percentage and 73% 
in the frequency condition). Whereas only 9% in the percentage condition used a short cut, 
22% in the frequency condition did so. Among participants who used a short cut in the 
frequency condition, most interpreted the 20% risk reduction as the event rate of 200 out of 
1,000 in the treatment group and then selected the RRR interpretation, which was closer to 
200 than the ARR interpretation. (This interpretation will be addressed in more detail in 
Experiment 2.) With respect to the ARR interpretations, 64% provided the formula to arrive at 
their answer, 9% used a short cut, and 18% guessed when the baseline risk was given as a 
percentage. Only eight participants made an ARR interpretation in the frequency condition, 
making it difficult to interpret the data. 
As the analysis shows, most people actually used a formal reasoning process to arrive 
at their estimate. This was the case regardless of whether they interpreted the statement as 
referring to a relative or absolute risk reduction.  
Table 2 
Classification of Participants’ Written Descriptions of Their Reasoning Processes in Experiment 1a. 
 Baseline risk as percentage Baseline risk as frequency 
Interpretation Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified Calculcation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified 
RRR  
(n=68) 
78% 
(18/23) 
9%  
(2/23) 
4%  
(1/23) 
9% 
(2/23) 
73%  
(33/45) 
22% 
(10/45) 
4%  
(2/45) 
− 
ARR  
(n=30) 
64%  
(14/22) 
9 %  
(2/22) 
18%  
(4/22) 
9% 
(2/22) 
38%  
(3/8) 
25% 
(2/8) 
0% 
(0/0) 
38% 
(3/8) 
Note. RRR = relative risk reduction, ARR = absolute risk reduction. Three participants did not provide a 
justification of their answer and were excluded from this analysis.  
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Experiment 1b 
The goal of Experiment 1b was to examine how participants interpret a statement about a 
relative risk increase (RRI interpretation) (Table 1). Again, such a statement might be falsely 
interpreted as an absolute risk increase (ARI interpretation), that is, an increase in percentage 
points. We hypothesized similar results to those in Experiment 1a, namely an influence of 
presentation format and low numerates being more likely to interpret the relative risk increase 
as an absolute increase, particularly when the baseline risk is presented as a percentage. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-seven participants (58.4 % female; Mage=33.7 years, SD=12.4) 
recruited via Amazon MTurk took part in an online study. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two baseline risk conditions {percentage vs. frequency}; they were paid 
$0.75 for participation.  
Materials and Procedure. The experimental procedure was virtually identical to 
Experiment 1a. However, participants were presented with a risk increase rather than risk 
reduction scenario. Specifically, participants were told that a drug for diabetes patients would 
increase the risk of heart disease by 20%. The baseline risk in the control group (i.e., patients 
who do not take the drug) was set to 30% out of 1,000 (baseline percentage condition) or 300 
out of 1,000 (baseline frequency condition). Participants had to choose between two possible 
answers: a relative risk increase interpretation (36% in the percentage condition, 360 out of 
1,000 in the frequency condition) and an absolute risk increase interpretation (50% and 500 
out of 1,000, respectively). The order of answers was randomized. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 2 shows that a number of participants erroneously interpreted the statement as 
an absolute risk increase, but that there was relatively little effect of presentation format. In 
the percentage condition, 67% (26/39) of participants gave an answer consistent with a 
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relative risk increase (two-tail binomial, p = .05). In the frequency condition, 76% (29/38) 
interpreted the statement as a relative risk increase (two-tail binomial, p = .002). Thus, 
regardless of the presentation format a majority of participants interpreted the statement as 
referring to a relative risk increase. One explanation for the weak influence of presentation 
format finding is that subjects may have relied on their background knowledge, concluding 
that a risk increase to 50% for a severe disease it too high. 
 
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1b. In the percentage condition, the event rate in the control group 
was set to 30%, in the frequency condition to 300 out of 1,000. “Total” includes all subjects' 
interpretations in the percentage and frequency condition (n=77). Low numerates are those with a 
numeracy score 
 
           
 
Numeracy analysis. As in Exp. 1a, we conducted a median split to categorize 
participants as low or high numerates. When baseline risk was conveyed as percentage, 50% 
(6/12) of low numerates correctly interpreted the statement (Figure 2). The lack of an overall 
effect of presentation format, as was seen in Exp. 1a for a relative risk reduction, is thus due 
to a higher number of low numerates correctly interpreting the risk increase statement, even 
when baseline risk was conveyed as percentage. At the same time, frequency information 
increased the proportion of low numerates' correct interpretations to 68%, although responses 
were at chance level (13/19; two-tail binomial, p = .17). As in Exp. 1a, presentation format 
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did not matter for the high numerates. When baseline risk was given as percentage, 79% 
(19/24; two-tail binomial, p = .007) gave the correct answer; in the frequency condition 83% 
(15/18; two-tail binomial, p = .008) correctly opted for the relative risk increase. Thus, similar 
to Experiment 1a, low numerates benefited from presenting the event rate in frequency 
format, while high numerates correctly understood the statement as a relative risk increase, 
independent of presentation format.  
Reasoning analysis. Table 2 shows the results of the reasoning analysis. In the 
percentage conditions, 65% provided the respective calculation when following a RRI 
interpretation and 73% when following an ARI interpretation (Table 3). For the frequency 
condition, the respective proportions were 79% and 67%. A short cut was used in 15% in the 
percentage and 17% in frequency condition in the RRI interpretations. Many of those who 
used a short cut referred to the fact that, given the base line risk, a 20% risk increase to 50% 
(or 500) out of 1,000 would be too high.  
Table 3 
Classification of Participants’ Written Descriptions of Their Reasoning Processes in Experiment 1b. 
 Baseline risk as percentage Baseline risk as frequency 
Interpretation Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified 
RRI  
(n=55) 
65% 
(17/26) 
15% 
(4/26) 
8%  
(2/26) 
12% 
(3/26) 
79%  
(23/29) 
17% 
(5/29) 
3% 
(1/29) 
− 
ARI  
(n=20) 
73%  
(8/11) 
9%  
(1/11) 
18%  
(2/11) 
− 
67%  
(6/9) 
11% 
(1/9) 
22% 
(2/9) 
− 
Note. RRI=relative risk increase, ARI=absolute risk increase. Two subjects did not provide a reason and were 
excluded from this analysis.  
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Experiment 2a 
Experiment 1a showed that people tend to interpret a relative risk reduction as an 
absolute risk reduction when (i) the event rate in the control is presented in percentage format, 
and (ii) people have low numeracy skills. A similar, albeit somewhat weaker pattern was 
observed with risk increase statements. In both experiments, the answer options were 
restricted to a RRR (RRI) and ARR (ARI) interpretation only. We designed Experiments 2a,b 
to further explore the range of possible interpretations and reasoning processes. For instance, 
what both previously tested interpretations have in common is that estimates are based on a 
comparison between treatment and control group. Although we explicitly stated that the 
evaluation of the drug was based on such a comparison, its intuitive consideration requires a 
basic understanding of the idea of randomized controlled trials.  
Are laypeople familiar with this concept and do they interpret the risk reduction 
statement accordingly? For example, one might ignore the information about the event rate in 
the control group and assume instead that the 20% risk reduction refers to the event rate in the 
treatment group (ER interpretation). In this case, the statement would not be interpreted as a 
reduction relative to the event rate in the control group (baseline risk), but as directly denoting 
the event rate in the treatment group. This interpretation is suggested by the written statements 
of some participants in Experiment 1a, who used a short cut based on such an interpretation 
(e.g., “20 percent of 1,000 is 200, so 240 is closer to 20 percent than the other 100”). Since we 
did not offer an ER interpretation, they may have opted for a relative risk interpretation, 
which was numerically closer to their intended interpretation.  
We consider these three interpretations (RRR, ARR and ER interpretation) as 
conceptual interpretations of a relative risk reduction statement, since they refer to three 
qualitatively different understandings. These interpretations must be distinguished from 
judgments resulting from mere computational errors. For instance, many people have 
difficulties converting percentages into frequencies and vice versa (Schwartz & Woloshin, 
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2009). In our example, 20% out of 1,000 corresponds to 200 in 1,000. However, a false 
conversion could result in the answer 20 out of 1,000 (which would be equivalent to a 2% risk 
reduction). Along with an ARR interpretation, this may then lead participants to interpret the 
20% risk reduction as 300 – 20 = 280 out of 1,000 in the frequency condition, or 
30% − 2% = 28% out of 1,000 in the percentage condition (Error I). Likewise, people may 
interpret the risk reduction statement as referring to the event rate in the treatment group, but 
conduct an error by estimating the event rate in the treatment group as 20 out of 1,000 or 2% 
out of 1,000 (Error II). Figure 3 outlines the different interpretations.   
 
A second goal of the current study was to examine how participants interpret the 
relative risk reduction when it is numerically larger than the baseline risk (for instance, when 
the baseline risk is 30% and the risk reduction is 40%). Such a scenario effectively rules out 
 
Figure 3. Five potential interpretations of a relative risk reduction statement, and estimates resulting 
from different interpretations. Depending on whether the event rate in the control group is considered 
or not, three different conceptual interpretations result (RRR interpretation, ARR interpretation, ER 
interpretation). In addition, two possible errors (Error I, Error II) are illustrated.  
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the possibility of interpreting the relative risk reduction as absolute difference: simply 
subtracting the two numbers would result in a negative value. As a consequence, the people in 
question should revise their initial interpretation and reconsider what the risk statement 
implies. 
Method 
Participants. 221 participants (53% female, Mage=35 years, SD=11.8) were recruited 
through Amazon’s MTurk for participating in an online study; they were paid $0.75. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: one of two presentation 
formats for baseline risk {percentage vs. frequency} × one of two levels of risk reduction 
{low=20% vs. high=40%}. 
Materials and Procedure. We used the same scenario as in Experiment 1a, according 
to which a new drug for diabetes patients reduces the risk of heart disease by 20% (see 
Appendix for full instructions), with two modifications. First, we provided participants with 
five answer options (see Figure 3 and Appendix). For the ER interpretation the answer was 
20% out of 1,000 (percentage condition) and 200 out of 1,000 (frequency condition). The 
answers corresponding to Error I were 28% out of 1,000 in the percentage condition and 280 
in 1,000 in the frequency condition. Error II corresponded to 2% out of 1,000 in the 
percentage condition and 20 in 1,000 in the frequency condition. All answers were presented 
in random order.  
Second, we varied the size of the risk reduction, being either 20% or 40%. Since the 
event rate in the control group was fixed at 30% [300] out of 1,000, the high risk reduction 
level precludes an ARR interpretation, which would yield a negative event rate in the 
treatment group (e.g., 30% − 40% = −10%). The question of interest in this case was whether 
the majority of participants would opt for the relative reduction interpretation or switch to one 
of the remaining answers, such as favoring the ER interpretation or Error I, which 
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conceptually resembles an ARR interpretation. The five answers for the 40% condition were 
adjusted for this risk reduction. As in the previous studies, the baseline risk in the control 
group was presented either as percentage (30% out of 1,000) or as frequency (300 out of 
1,000).   
Results and Discussion 
Figure 4 shows the results of Experiment 2a. When the risk reduction was 20% 
(Figure 4a), a strong influence of presentation format was observed. When baseline risk was 
communicated as percentage, the two most frequent answers were an ARR interpretation 
(43%) and an RRR interpretation (37%). By contrast, when baseline risk was presented as 
frequency, 72% of subjects correctly interpreted the statement as a relative risk reduction; 
only 10% chose an ARR interpretation. This corroborates the findings of Experiment 1a, 
showing that using frequencies to provide baseline risk helps people to understand the 
intended meaning of a risk reduction statement.  
 What about the alternative interpretations? In both conditions, a similar percentage of 
participants interpreted the risk reduction statement as directly referring to the event rate in 
the treatment group (ER interpretation): 14% in the percentage condition and 10% 
participants in the frequency condition. Few errors were observed in either condition (Figure 
4a). 
 Does ruling out a meaningful ARR interpretation change the interpretation pattern? 
Figure 4b shows the results for the conditions in which the baseline risk was 30% [300] out of 
1,000 and the risk reduction was 40%. Overall, no substantial difference between the two 
presentation formats was observed. Regardless of whether the event rate in the control group 
was presented as percentage or frequency, the (correct) RRR interpretation was the most 
common answer (60% in the percentage condition and 66% in the frequency condition). Very 
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few people (4 out of 123 across both conditions) gave an ARR interpretation, meaning that 
they judged the risk in the treatment group to be zero.  
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
 Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2a (N=221). (a) Interpretations in the 20% risk reduction 
condition (n=98). (b) Interpretations in the 40% risk reduction condition (n=123). In all 
conditions the baseline risk was set to 30% (percentage condition) or 300 (frequency condition) 
out of 1,000.  
 
While the high risk reduction statement eliminated the ARR interpretations as 
expected, the interesting finding is that in both conditions an increased proportion of people 
opted for the ER interpretation (21% in the percentage condition and 14% of participants in 
the frequency condition). These participants considered the risk reduction as directly referring 
to the event rate in the treatment group. In addition, more participants made computational 
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errors, accounting for 17% of responses in the percentage condition and 15% in the frequency 
condition (aggregating across the two types of errors, with more people making Error I, see 
Figure 4b).  
Overall, eliminating an ARR interpretation as meaningful response strongly increased 
the number of correct interpretations even when baseline risk was presented as percentage, 
but we also observed that a considerable number of people chose the event rate interpretation 
or performed computational errors when assessing the treatment effect. 
Numeracy. In all four conditions, strong differences between low and high numerates 
were observed (Figure 5). Most of the high numerates correctly understood the relative risk 
reduction statement, except for the condition in which the baseline risk was 30% and the 
reduction was 20%, in which only 53% of high numeracy participants gave the correct 
answer. In the low risk reduction conditions, the most common misunderstanding was the 
ARR interpretation, with 33% in the percentage condition and 12% in the frequency 
condition. In the low risk reduction percentage condition, only 11% of the low numerates 
followed an RRR interpretation, while 61% interpreted it as an absolute risk reduction. 
Between 44% and 47% followed an RRR interpretation in the other three conditions. The 
second most common answer was the ER interpretation, made by about one quarter (22% -
 28%) of the low numerates. Error I was particularly frequent in the 40% risk reduction 
conditions, (20% in the percentage and 17% in the frequency condition).   
In sum, low numerates had great difficulties interpreting the risk reduction statement. 
This was largely independent of the presentation format and the magnitude of the risk 
reduction. With the exception of the low risk percentage condition, high numerates performed 
equally well across conditions. Eliminating a meaningful ARR interpretation led to a higher 
proportion of answering corresponding to an ER interpretation or Error I. 
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a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
Figure 5. Results of Experiment 2a for low and high numerates (N=210). (a) Interpretations in 
the 20% percentage condition (n=45), (b) interpretations in the 20% frequency condition 
(n=49), (c) interpretations in the 40% percentage condition (n=45), (d) Judgments in the 40% 
frequency condition (n=71). 
 
Reasoning analysis. As in the previous studies, we analyzed participants’ written 
explanations of their estimates and reasoning processes (Table 4). Having found no 
differences in the reasoning process between the low and high risk conditions, we 
summarized the results and presented them according to presentation format of baseline risk 
(percentage vs. frequency). At least two thirds of the participants following either one of the 
conceptual interpretations (RRR, ARR, or ER interpretation) explicitly stated the respective 
calculation. This was independent of the presentation format. People making an RRR 
interpretation used short cuts more frequently (16% in the percentage and 13% in the 
frequency format), whereas those making an ER interpretation guessed more often, 
particularly in the percentage condition (27%). A common short cut of the RRR interpreters in 
the high risk reduction condition was to roughly consider a 50% risk reduction and “add a 
little” to the treatment group’s event rate in order to arrive at a 40% risk reduction. When it 
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comes to the errors—which were in general rare in all four conditions—the pattern becomes 
slightly unclear. Few participants referred to the actual formula, but instead used a short cut or 
guessed. Hence, some participants who selected an answer option based on the error might 
have had another reasoning process, as we originally hypothesized. 
Table 4 
Classification of Participants’ Written Descriptions of Their Reasoning Processes in Experiment 2a, 
Averaged Across the 20% and 40% Risk Reduction Condition. 
 Baseline risk as percentage Baseline risk as frequency 
Interpretation Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified 
RRR  
(n=127) 
73%  
(33/45) 
16%  
(7/45) 
9%  
(4/45) 
2.2%  
(1/45) 
81%  
(66/82) 
13%  
(11/82) 
5%  
(4/82) 
1% 
(1/82) 
ARR  
(n=29) 
76%  
(16/21) 
10%  
(2/21) 
10%  
(2/21) 
4.8% 
(1/21) 
75%  
(6/8) 
25% 
(2/8) 
− − 
ER  
(n=30) 
67% 
(10/15) 
7% 
(1/15) 
27% 
(4/15) 
− 
67% 
(10/15) 
7% 
(1/15) 
13% 
(2/15) 
13% 
(2/15) 
Error I 
(n=20) 
33% 
(3/9) 
11% 
(1/9) 
56% 
(5/9) 
− 
27% 
(3/11) 
36% 
(4/11) 
27% 
(3/11) 
9% 
(1/11) 
Error II 
(n=5) 
− 
100% 
(1/1) 
− − 
50% 
(2/4) 
25% 
(1/4) 
25% 
(1/4) 
− 
Note. RRR = relative risk reduction, ARR = absolute risk reduction, ER = event rate interpretation. Ten subjects 
did not provide a reason and were excluded from this analysis.  
 
Experiment 2b 
In  Experiment 2b, we examined participants’ interpretations of a relative risk 
increase, with multiple answer options and under conditions in which interpreting the 
statement as an absolute increase was not meaningful. We used and adapted the five answer 
options from Experiment 2a and manipulated the size of the risk increase (20% vs. 80%). 
Because the sum of the baseline risk (30% and 300 out of 1,000) exceeds 100% or 1,000 out 
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of 1,000, respectively, high risk increase of 80% should reduce the likelihood of an absolute 
risk increase interpretation.  
Method 
Participants. 180 participants (61% female, Mage=29 years, SD=8.9) were recruited 
through Amazon’s MTurk for an online study; they were paid $0.75. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: one of two baseline risk presentation formats 
{Percentage vs. Frequency} × one of two levels of risk increase {low=20% vs. high=80%}. 
Materials and Procedure. We used the same medical scenario as in Experiment 1b, 
in which a drug for diabetes patients had been shown to increase the risk of heart disease. The 
only difference was that participants had five answer options available (see Appendix).  
Results and Discussion 
Overall, a lower proportion of correct responses was observed than in the risk 
reduction scenario. In the low risk increase condition, when baseline risk was given as a 
percentage, only 31% correctly interpreted the statement as a relative risk increase (Figure 
6a); 44% of participants interpreted it as an absolute risk increase, and 16% interpreted it as 
referring to the event rate in the treatment group (ER interpretation).  
When the baseline risk was conveyed as a frequency, the most common answer (54%) 
corresponded to a relative risk increase; about 16% considered the statement as referring to an 
absolute increase. Interestingly, the second most common answer (22%) was based on 
assuming the statement to directly refer to the event rate in the treatment group (ER 
interpretation). Errors were relatively rare, regardless of presentation format (Figure 6a). 
What happened in the high risk increase condition? In this case, regardless of whether 
baseline risk was given in terms of percentages or frequencies, the most common answer 
corresponded—correctly—to a relative increase. However, in terms of absolute numbers, only 
about half of the subjects correctly understood the risk information. Excluding the absolute 
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risk increase as meaningful estimate led to a substantial proportion of people either assuming 
the risk statement to refer directly to the event rate in the treatment group or following Error I 
(Figure 6b). Notably, a higher proportion of errors was observed than in the low risk 
condition. 
a) 
 
b) 
 
 Figure 6. Results of Experiment 2b for (a) the 20% risk increase condition in the percentage and 
frequency condition (n=90) and for (b) the 80% risk increase condition (n=99).  
 
Numeracy analysis. The numeracy analyses yielded clear differences between people 
with low and high numeracy skills (Figure 7). The key finding is that low numeracy people 
were particularly likely to misinterpret the risk statement as referring to an absolute increase. 
Only when this interpretation was not meaningful (i.e., in the conditions in which adding up 
baseline risk and increase would exceed 100%) did a substantial proportion of people 
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correctly interpret the statement as a relative increase. Interestingly, many low numerates 
interpreted the risk statement as denoting the actual risk level in the treatment group (ER 
interpretation), suggesting that they ignored the fact that the treatment’s effectiveness was 
relative to a control group. Moreover, a high proportion of them were observed to follow 
Error I, primarily in the high risk percentage conditions. 
 
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
Figure 7. Results of Experiment 2b for low and high numerates (N=176). (a) Interpretations in 
the low risk (20%) percentage format condition (n=42), (b) interpretations in the 20% frequency 
condition (n=43), (c) interpretations in the 40% percentage condition (n=44), and (d) 
interpretations in the 40% frequency condition (n=47). 
 
What about high numeracy people? High numerates had most difficulties in the low risk 
increase condition when baseline risk was provided as percentage, with 56% making a RRI 
interpretation and 44%  making an ARI interpretation (Figure 7). Between 64% and 70% of high 
numerates followed the intended RRI interpretation in the other three conditions. For high 
numerates, the most common misinterpretation was the ER interpretation (between 13 and 22%, 
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depending on condition). Few errors were observed.  
The observed pattern resembles the results of the previous experiments. Low numerates 
had difficulties interpreting the risk increase statement as intended. However, high numerates also 
showed a stronger tendency to misunderstand the risk increase statement than when given the risk 
reduction scenario. 
Reasoning analysis. Table 5 summarizes results of participants' reasoning in the 
percentage and frequency condition, aggregated for the low and high risk conditions.  
Table 5 
Classification of Participants’ Written Descriptions of Their Reasoning Procesess in Experiment 2b, 
Averaged Across the 20% and 80% Risk Increase Condition. 
 Baseline risk as percentage Baseline risk as frequency 
Interpretation Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified Calculation Short 
Cut 
Guess Unidentified 
RRI  
(n=87) 
79%  
(30/38) 
16%  
(6/38) 
5%  
(2/38) 
− 
83%  
(41/49) 
10 %  
(5/49) 
0% 
 
6% 
(3/49) 
ARI  
(n=29) 
81%  
(17/21) 
5%  
(1/21) 
5%  
(1/21) 
10% 
(2/21) 
63%  
(5/8) 
25% 
(2/8) 
13% 
(1/8) 
− 
ER  
(n=37) 
79% 
(10/13) 
23% 
(3/13) 
0% 
 
− 
75% 
(18/24) 
17% 
(4/24) 
8% 
(2/24) 
− 
Error I 
(n=15) 
50% 
(4/8) 
25% 
(2/8) 
25% 
(2/8) 
− 
43% 
(3/7) 
14 % 
(1/7) 
14% 
(1/7) 
29% 
(2/7) 
Error II 
(n=9) 
100% 
(4/4) 
− − − 
20% 
(1/5) 
80% 
(4/5) 
− − 
Note. RRI = relative risk increase, ARI = absolute risk increase, ER = event rate interpretation. Eleven subjects 
did not provide a reason and were excluded from this analysis.  
 
The majority of participants who made one of the three conceptual interpretations 
explicitly stated the formula of the respective interpretation. This pattern is similar in the 
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percentage and frequency conditions. The small sample size for the Error interpretations 
limits generalizations of this pattern. 
General Discussion 
Our studies show that the correct understanding of relative risk information with 
baseline risk depends (1) on the presentation format of the baseline risk and (2) people’s 
numeracy skills. A large proportion of participants misunderstood relative risk information 
when the baseline risk was presented in a percentage format. Specifically, when the baseline 
risk was larger than the relative risk reduction, participants tended to interpret a relative risk 
reduction as an absolute reduction, thereby overestimating the actual treatment effect. 
Communicating baseline risk in a frequency format improved subjects’ comprehension. Our 
findings also show an influence of people’s numeracy skills: Whereas high numerates tended 
to interpret relative risk statements correctly, independent of format, low numerates were 
likely to misunderstand relative risk information. These participants particularly benefited 
from baseline risk being conveyed in a frequency format. Finally, even when the possibility of 
misinterpreting a relative risk reduction as an absolute reduction was ruled out because the 
reduction was larger than the baseline risk, other misunderstandings were observed. For 
instance, many participants understood the risk reduction as directly referring to the event rate 
in the treatment group. Results for relative risk increases were similar, but showed a slightly 
larger proportion of misunderstandings for high numerates as well. 
Previous research has documented that treatments framed in terms of relative risk 
reductions are preferred over equivalent treatments framed in terms of absolute risk 
reductions (e.g., Akl et al., 2011; Covey, 2007; Edwards et al., 2001). Our analyses offer an 
explanation as to why this happens: Most misinterpretations of relative risk statements lead to 
a strong overestimation of the actual treatment effect. For instance, in Experiment 1a and 2a, 
incorrectly interpreting the relative reduction as an absolute reduction leads to an 
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overestimation of the treatment effect by 14 percentage points. Even when the baseline risk 
was presented in frequency format and an absolute risk reduction interpretation was ruled out, 
about one third of participants could not provide the correct estimate. Conceptual 
misunderstandings (e.g., ignoring the control group) as well as computational errors remain a 
source of misperception. 
The problem of using relative risk reductions and increases in practice becomes even 
more evident when considering that information about baseline risk is usually omitted in 
health messages. Schwartz, Woloshin, Dvorin, and Welch (2006) found that leading medical 
journals often report ratio measures without explicitly stating the baseline risk, which is left 
unclear. This adds an additional source of ambiguity and uncertainty. For instance, Natter and 
Berry (2005) found that if no baseline risk is provided, people strongly overestimate risks. 
In summary, seemingly simple mathematical concepts like relative risk reductions and 
increases may result in misinformed and misled patients, even when information on the 
baseline risk is provided. Hence, the use of relative risk reduction contributes to the 
phenomena of biased reporting in medical journals, biased reporting in pamphlets, and biased 
reporting the media—three out of the “seven sins in health care” (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). 
Even more disconcerting is that in one out of three abstracts published in leading medical 
journals—JAMA, BMJ, and The Lancet—treatment benefits are reported as relative risk 
reduction but potential harms are reported in absolute numbers, which makes them appear 
small in relation; a phenomenon called mismatched framing (Gigerenzer et al. 2010; 
Sedrakyan & Shih, 2007). Likewise, media analyses show that many pamphlets, websites, and 
newspapers tend to either communicate no numerical information at all about treatments or 
only in terms of relative risk reductions (Bodemer et al., 2012; Jorgensen & Gøtzsche, 2004; 
Moynihan et al., 2000; Slaytor & Ward, 1998). As a consequence, biased risk communication 
undermines the idea of shared decision making—patients' active participation in making 
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informed health decisions—in two ways. First, treatment recommendations by health 
professionals and policy-makers are based on nontransparent and incomplete information. 
Second, patients cannot correctly assess and evaluate treatment benefits and harms, and may 
select treatments that they would not favor had they been properly informed. The 
consequences are far-reaching and lead to poor decision making both on the individual and on 
a public health level, with negative effects for health and health care systems (Gigerenzer & 
Gray, 2011).  
A problem related to biased reporting is the fact that large proportions of the public 
have difficulties understanding statistical information and lack the ability to identify 
nontransparent formats and translate them into more transparent statistics (Peters, 2008; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Reyna et al., 2009). For instance, Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 
(2010) assessed numeracy on samples in the USA and Germany. The study not only identified 
large differences in numeracy skills between lower and higher educated people but also 
showed that numerical and statistical literacy is prevalent even in well-educated samples 
(Lipkus et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 1997). These findings stress the importance of 
communicating health information as transparently and intuitively as possible. An alternative 
format for communicating benefits and harms is the fact box (Arkes & Gaissmaier, in press; 
Bodemer et al., 2012; Schwartz & Woloshin, 2009). Figure 8 shows an example of a fact box 
for breast cancer screening. It provides information on how many out of 1,000 women who do 
not participate in mammography screening and how many women who do participate in 
routine screening will die from breast cancer in the next ten years. In addition, it provides 
information on the overall cancer mortality as well as potential harms as a consequence of 
overdiagnosis and overtreatment due to false positives. Such fact boxes enable health-care 
consumers to make more informed decisions for or against treatments based on the currently 
available scientific evidence. 
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Figure 8. Fact box summarizing medical evidence of the effects of mammography on breast cancer 
mortality and cancer mortality. In addition, information about potential harms (e.g., overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment) is communicated (Source: www.harding-center.com/fact-boxes/mammography, 
retrieved on 15 March 2012). 
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Appendix 
Scenario used in Experiment 2a (Relative risk reduction) 
 
A study tested a new drug for diabetes. The study’s aim was to find out whether and to what extent the 
new drug reduced the risk of heart disease. To evaluate the new drug, 2,000 patients with diabetes were 
tested. The patients were randomly assigned to two groups: 1,000 patients received the new drug and 
1,000 patients received no drug. The patients receiving no drug served as a control group. After five 
years, the number of patients with heart diseases in each of the two groups was compared.  
 
Subjects in the baseline percentage condition received then the following information: 
In the control group without the drug 30% of the patients had heart disease. 
The study showed that the new drug reduced the risk of heart disease by 20%. 
Please estimate how many patients in the group with the drug suffered from heart disease: 
 
O  24% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  10% out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  20% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  28% out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  2% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
 
 
Subjects in the baseline frequency condition received the same information, but here the 
baseline risk was presented in frequency format: 
In the control group without the drug 300 out of 1,000 of the patients had heart disease. 
The study showed that the new drug reduced the risk of heart disease by 20%. 
Please estimate how many patients in the group with the drug suffered from heart disease: 
 
O  240 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  100 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  200 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  280 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  20 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
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Scenario used in Experiment 2b (Relative risk increase) 
 
 
A study tested a new drug for patients with diabetes. The study’s aim was to find out whether and to 
what extent the new drug increased the risk of heart attack (a side-effect of the drug) in patients with 
diabetes. To evaluate the new drug’s side-effects, 2,000 patients with diabetes were tested. The patients 
were randomly assigned to two groups: 1,000 patients received the new drug and 1,000 patients 
received no drug. The patients receiving no drug served as a control group. After five years, the number 
of patients with heart attack in each of the two groups was compared. 
 
Subjects in the baseline percentage condition received then the following information: 
In the control group without the drug 30% of the patients had heart disease. 
The study showed that the new drug increased the risk of heart disease by 20%. 
Please estimate how many patients in the group with the drug suffered from heart disease: 
 
O  36% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  50% out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  20% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  32% out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  2% out of 1,000  patients who received the drug had heart disease 
 
 
Subjects in the baseline frequency condition received the same information, but here the 
baseline risk was presented in frequency format: 
In the control group without the drug 300 out of 1,000 of the patients had heart disease. 
The study showed that the new drug reduced the risk of heart disease by 20%. 
Please estimate how many patients in the group with the drug suffered from heart disease: 
 
O  360 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  500 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  200 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  320 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
O  20 out of 1,000 patients who received the drug had heart disease 
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Abstract 
Ambiguity is inherent in information about benefits and harms of medical treatments, 
but it is usually not included in health risk communication. By ambiguity we mean imprecise 
estimates about treatment effects such as ranges, confidence intervals, or standard errors. 
Research on monetary gambles found that people are ambiguity averse—they prefer certain 
over ambiguous options—in the domain of gains, but ambiguity seeking—they prefer 
ambiguous over certain options—in the domain of losses. We aimed at transferring the 
concepts of ambiguity to medical treatment choice and how people choose between to 
treatments that differ in the degree of ambiguity and their average rate of benefits or harms. In 
Study 1, we presented participants with two treatments that offered either certain or 
ambiguous information. Treatment options were either presented as benefits or harms. We 
found that (1) participants were able to identify superior options, even when ambiguity was 
present and (2) did not show ambiguity aversion in the benefits condition or ambiguity 
seeking in the harms condition. Experiment 2 extended these findings by mapping 
participants’ choice strategies. Results suggest high heterogeneity in peoples’ choice 
strategies. Neither ambiguity aversion nor ambiguity seeking can sufficiently explain choice 
strategies. Large proportions of participants focused primarily on either the lower or upper 
bounds of the treatment options, or compared treatments average rates by focusing on the 
range’s midpoint. We suggest that including ambiguity in health risk communication allows 
people to make individual and informed decisions based on evidence and its limitations. 
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Introduction 
Uncertainty plays an important role in medicine (Politi, Col, & Han, 2007). First, 
scientific evidence is limited. Even randomized controlled trials – often regarded as the gold 
standard in medical research – have limitations due to design principles, sample size, and lack 
of validity and reliability of measures. Second, risk estimates are based on population data 
and therefore cannot be applied one-to-one to individuals. Third, risk estimates are based on 
past events. Their application to the present and future rests on the assumption that the 
environment and underlying forces do not change. In this paper, we refer to a particular type 
of uncertainty – ambiguity. Ambiguity describes the imprecision of an estimate due to limited 
reliability, credibility, or adequacy of information (Camerer & Weber, 1992) or—in other 
words— “uncertainty about probability, created by missing information” (Frisch & Baron 
1986). Expressions of ambiguity are probabilistic parameters such as standard deviations, 
expert confidence ratings, or ranges (Han, Klein, & Arora, 2011; Politi et al., 2007). For 
instance, a patient’s lifetime risk for colorectal cancer can be expressed as a precise point 
estimate such as 9%, or as an ambiguous estimate of between 5%-13% (Han, Klein, Lehman, 
Killam, Massett, & Freedman, 2010). Moreover, ambiguity here refers to scientific-centered 
(data-centered) ambiguity; other sources comprise system- and patient-centered ambiguity 
which are not part of this study (Han et al., 2011).   
The inclusion of ambiguity in medical risk communication conforms to the ideal of 
shared decision making—to present transparent and complete information as basis to include 
patients in their decisions about health (Edwards & Elywn, 2001; Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). 
Medical associations such as the Cochrane Collaboration recommend to include uncertainty 
information in form of confidence intervals (with exact p-values) to evaluate the quality of the 
available evidence and “assess the clinical usefulness of the intervention” (Higgins & Green, 
2009, p.12.10). However indicators of uncertainty are rarely, if ever, included in patient 
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information (e.g., Bodemer, Müller, Okan, Garcia-Retamero, & Neumeyer-Gromen, 2012; 
Politi et al., 2007) or in physician-patient dialogues (Braddock, Edwards, Hasenberg, Laidley, 
& Levinson, 1999).  
Whereas some argue for disclosing ambiguity or uncertainty to provide a more 
complete picture of the quality of the available evidence (Ancker, Senathirajah, Kukafka, & 
Starren, 2006; Feufel, Antes, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Han et al., 2009), others voice major 
objections. Some experts believe that patients are incapable of understanding and reasoning 
about uncertainty. For instance, when food experts were asked about the disclosure of 
uncertainty about food risks to the public, most experts believed that the public cannot 
conceptualize uncertainty and would react with panic and confusion (Frewer, Hunt, Brennan, 
Kuznesof, Ness, & Ritson, 2003). This view is supported by research showing that people 
have difficulty in processing ambiguous information (e.g., Epstein, 1999; Viscusi, Wesley & 
Huber, 1991) and tend to maintain an illusion of certainty (Gigerenzer, 2003; Gigerenzer, 
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Mielcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007).  
Communication and effects of ambiguity 
Due to unfamiliarity with the concepts of ambiguity (Ibrekk & Morgan, 1988; Johnson 
& Slovic, 1995), people’s behavior is often described as ambiguity averse (Ellsberg, 1961). 
Ambiguity aversion2 describes the phenomenon that people tend to prefer known risks (i.e., 
certain options) over unknown risks (i.e., ambiguous options) in monetary gambles (Curley & 
Yates, 1985; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Epstein, 1999; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999; Camerer & 
Weber, 1992).  For instance, participants are willing to pay a higher price in a gamble with a 
precise probability compared with an ambiguous probability (Fox & Tversky, 1995). Even 
when the odds favor the ambiguous treatment, some researchers still found that people are 
                                                             
2 We will use the term ambiguity aversion here (see also Han et al., 2011; Politi et al., 2007), but it should be 
noted that it is closely related to the concept of risk aversion which describes that people prefer certain payoffs 
over uncertain payoffs (see also Epstein, 1999).  
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ambiguity averse and prefer the certain but less favorable option (Keren & Gerritsen, 1999). 
Whether a decision maker is ambiguity averse depends on whether gains or losses are at 
stake. Ambiguity aversion has been primarily observed in the domain of gains, while 
changing the perspective to losses shifts people’s tendency of ambiguity aversion to 
ambiguity seeking (Laughhunn, Payne, & Crum, 1980). What underlies people’s tendency of 
ambiguity aversion? Heath and Tversky (1991) argued that ambiguity generally makes people 
feel uncomfortable as it signals a lack of knowledge. Other research argues that presenting a 
range of possible outcomes may shift attention to the worst outcome which people then try to 
avoid (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985, Visuci et al., 1991). As we will show later this does not 
necessarily imply to avoid ambiguous options. 
To date, only little is known about the influence of ambiguity in medical risk 
information on risk perception and medical choice behavior. In medicine, presenting health 
risks in terms of a range of possible outcomes (e.g., 5% - 13% lifetime risk of colon cancer) 
instead of as a point estimate (e.g., 9% lifetime risk of colon cancer) increases perceived risk, 
worry and distress among patients (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Han et al., 2009, 2010). 
Moreover, some researchers argue that patients are similarly ambiguity averse as in monetary 
gambles and point to results that show people’s decreased engagement in particular health 
behaviors such as willingness to participate in PSA screening for early detection of prostate 
cancer when presented with ambiguous information (Briss, 2004; Frosch, Kaplan, & Felitti, 
2001; Raffle, 2001). Yet, other researchers did not find a direct effect of ambiguity on health 
behaviors such as, for instance, uptake rates for early detection of cancer (Farrell, Murphy, & 
Schneider, 2002; Taplin, Urban, Taylor, & Savarino, 1997). Like for monetary gambles, the 
influence of ambiguity might change depending on whether ambiguity relates to medical 
benefits or harms. The benefits of a treatment resemble a gain situation and may lead to 
ambiguity aversion. In contrast, the harms of a treatment resemble a loss situation and people 
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may react with ambiguity seeking. To the best of our knowledge, research has not yet 
addressed this question in medical treatment choice. 
In this research, we aimed at investigating the role of ambiguity, and in particular 
whether ambiguity aversion and seeking found in monetary gambles exist also in medical 
choices. Thereby, we focused on answering the following questions. First: Do people react 
averse to ambiguity when choosing medical treatments when benefits are presented? Do 
people seek ambiguity when choosing medical treatments when harms are presented? Second: 
Do people identify a superior3 treatment despite the presence of ambiguity? How do people 
choose when such a superior treatment is not present? Third: Which choice strategies underlie 
treatment selection? 
The influence of numeracy on decision making under ambiguity 
A growing body of literature highlights the importance of individual differences in 
decision making tasks (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011). When it comes to 
people’s understanding of health risks, a cognitive ability that has been found to predict 
choices is numeracy (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 
2009). High numerates have been found to be more precise in their numerical interpretation 
and less prone to framing effects (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, 
Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert, 2006; Peters & Levin, 2008). Moreover, low numerates have 
difficulties in choosing normatively better options and choose based on different strategies 
compared with high numerates (Pachur & Galesic, 2012). In a similar vein, research on the 
perceived risk of breast cancer documents that more educated women appreciate ambiguity 
information in form of ranges whereas less educated women interpret a range as vague and 
                                                             
3 Here, the superior option always refers to a higher rate of benefits or lower rate of harms on any of the values 
independent of whether one compares the average rates of the treatments or the lower and upper bound of the 
ranges. 
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confusing (Schapira, Nattinger, & McHorney, 2001). We investigate whether numeracy 
moderates effects of ambiguity on people’s treatment choice. 
Hypotheses  
In our experiments, participants had to choose between two treatment options that 
differed in their degree of ambiguity. One option’s effectiveness was certain (presented as 
point estimate of rate of benefits/ harms), and one option’s effectiveness was ambiguous 
(range of benefits/ harms). We used a range to communicate ambiguity in line with previous 
studies on ambiguity in risk communication (e.g., Han et al., 2009; Han et al., 2010; Schapira 
et al., 2001). Besides differences in the degree of ambiguity, treatments had either equivalent 
average rates of benefits or harms, or differed in the average rates with one having a higher 
average rate. The average rate of the certain option corresponded to the point estimate; the 
average rate of the ambiguity option corresponded to the midpoint of the range (Han et al., 
2009; Schapira et al., 2001). Finally, either benefits or harms were presented. We hypothesized 
the following in the different conditions: 
1. When treatments differ in their degree of ambiguity, but not in their average rates 
H1a: The majority of participants shows ambiguity aversion and avoids the ambiguous 
option when benefits are presented. 
 H1b: The majority of participants seeks ambiguity and chooses the ambiguous option 
when harms are presented. 
2. When treatments differ in their degree of ambiguity and average rates 
H2a: The majority of participants indentifies and chooses the superior option in the 
benefits and harms condition, independently of ambiguity.  
H2b: The majority of participants choose the option with higher average rate when no 
clear superior option is presented in the benefits and harms condition.   
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H3: Low numerates have more difficulty in finding a superior option, so we expect to 
observe higher variance in choices in low numerates compared with high numerates. 
Study 1 
Experiment 1a 
Method 
Design and Procedure. To avoid any influence of prior knowledge, participants 
received the following hypothetical medical scenario.  
In this study, we ask you to imagine that you have been feeling sick for two days with fever, headaches, and 
fatigue. Your doctor diagnoses that you have a bacterial infection called TIRA. If left untreated, the symptoms 
will persist for at least 4 weeks and the risk of relapses will be elevated.  
We will present you with four different scenarios that provide you with information about the treatment for 
TIRA. The benefits of the treatments are similar for all scenarios, whereas the harms differ. Evidence of the 
potential harms is displayed in a red box.  
Please read the information carefully and answer each question.  
Note: We are interested in your personal opinion, there is no right or wrong answer! 
Subsequently, participants received six scenarios in random order. Between subjects, 
we presented participants either with treatment benefits (number of people who are symptom-
free after 3 days) or treatment harms (number of people who experience stomach bleeding as 
side effect); everything else was held constant. This manipulation aimed to elicit a gain or loss 
situation. In each scenario, participants had to choose between two medical treatments 
presented as a certain option (e.g., 20 out of 100 patients taking this treatment are symptom 
free after 3 days) and an ambiguous option (e.g., between 10 – 30 out of 100 patients taking 
this treatment are symptom free after 3 days). The six scenarios can be grouped into three sets 
of two scenarios each (see Table 1).  
Set I: Scenarios A and B each showed two treatments with the same average rate of 
benefits or harms, but one option being certain and one ambiguous. Ambiguity was high 
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(range = 20) in scenario A and low (range = 4) in scenario B. The objective was to 
demonstrate whether participants prefer the certain over the ambiguous option when their 
average rates of benefits and harms are identical. 
Set II: In scenarios C and D, treatment 1 had higher rate of benefits or harms than 
treatment 2 (20 out of 100 vs. 17 out of 100). In scenario C, the option with the higher 
average rate (treatment 1) was presented as certain and the one with the lower average rate 
(treatment 2) with low ambiguity (range = 4). In scenario D, treatment 1 had low ambiguity, 
whereas treatment 2 was certain. In both scenarios, treatment 1 was clearly superior to 
treatment 2 in the benefits condition, and treatment 2 superior to treatment 1 in the harms 
condition. This set aimed at testing whether participants were able to identify the superior 
treatment option when presented with ambiguous information. 
Set III: In scenarios E and F, treatment 1 again had a higher average rate than 
treatment 2 (20 out of 100 vs. 17 out of 100). In scenario E, treatment 1 was certain and 
treatment 2 highly ambiguous (range = 20); this manipulation was identical but reversed in 
scenario F. This set aimed at investigating participants’ choice behavior when ranges and 
point estimate overlap and an overall superior option was absent. 
The order of the scenarios and the two treatments was randomized within the 
scenarios. After all six scenarios, we assessed participants’ numeracy skills using the Berlin 
Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). 
Participants. A total of 106 participants of which 54% were female took part in this 
experiment (n=54 in the benefits and n=52 in the harms condition). The average age was 33 
years (SD=12.1). Participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk and randomly assigned to 
one of two conditions {harms, benefits}. Remuneration was $0.75.  
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Table 1  
The Three Sets and Six Scenarios of Experiment 1a. Random Halves of Participants Were Told That 
the Treatment Information Is Either About Benefits or Harms, Respectively. In The Benefits Condition, 
a Treatment Is Better the Higher the Rates Are, Whereas in the Harms Condition Lower Values 
Signal a Better Treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
Treatment Choice. We first present the results for the benefit condition (Figure 1). In 
set I, when treatments differed on their degree of ambiguity (certain vs. ambiguous), more 
people chose the certain option when ambiguity was high (scenario A: 65% vs. 35%, two-tail 
Set Ambiguity Scenario 
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
2 
I 
(same average 
rates, high or 
low 
ambiguity) 
certain vs. 
high 
A 20 10 – 30 
certain vs. low B 20 18 – 22 
II 
(different 
average rates, 
low 
ambiguity) 
certain vs. low C 20 15 – 19 
low vs. certain D 18 - 22 17 
III 
(different 
average rates, 
high 
ambiguity) 
certain vs. 
high 
E 20 7 – 27 
high vs. 
certain 
F 10 – 30 17 
Chapter 5 –Treatment choice under ambiguity  110 
  
binomial test, p=.04). However, when ambiguity was low, only about half of the participants 
chose the certain option (scenario B: 56% vs. 44%, two-tail binomial, p =.49). Hence, on an 
aggregated level, participants did not show ambiguity aversion. In set II—different average 
rates, low ambiguity (range = 4)—the majority of participants chose the treatment with the 
higher average rate (91% and 94%), that is, the option that was superior (two-tail binomial, 
p=.001). In other words, participants had no difficulty in identifying the superior option 
despite ambiguity. In set III— different average rates, high ambiguity (range = 20)—we 
found that the majority chose the option with the higher average rate (91%, p=.001) when it 
was presented as certain (scenario E). However, only 72% (p=.001) chose this option when 
presented with high ambiguity (scenario F); that implies that 28% chose the certain estimate 
that was on average inferior. Hence, one fourth reacted in line with the concept of ambiguity 
aversion.  
 
Figure 1. Percentages of participants who chose treatment 1 in Experiment 1a for the benefits 
condition. Total refers to all participants (n=54); low numerates to participants with a numeracy score 
<2 (n=27); high numerates to participants with a score ≥2 (n=27). 
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When the outcomes were presented as harms (Figure 2), lower values (lower average 
rates) signaled a better treatment (i.e., the fewer out of 100 patients experience stomach 
bleeding). In set I, 56% in scenario A chose the treatment with high ambiguity (treatment 2) 
and 61% in scenario B chose the treatment with low ambiguity (two-tailed binomial, p=.488; 
p=.126). Hence, half of the participants made choices consistent with ambiguity seeking. In 
set II, all participants chose treatment 2—the one with the lower average rate of harms—over 
treatment 1 (in scenario C and D), independently of whether it was certain or had low 
ambiguity. More precisely, participants identified the superior option. In set III, when one 
option was certain and one had high ambiguity, 85% of participants chose treatment 2 (the 
one with a lower average rate of harms) when it was (highly) ambiguous (two-tailed binomial, 
p=.001), while 75% did so when it was certain. In other words, one fourth chose consistently 
with the prediction of ambiguity seeking in scenario F (two-tailed binomial, p=.002). 
 
Figure 2. Percentages of participants who chose treatment 2 in Experiment 1a for the harms condition. 
Total refers to all participants (n=52); low numerates to participants with a numeracy score <2 (n=23); 
high numerates to participants with a score ≥2 (n=28). 
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Numeracy. We conducted a median split to group participants into low (numeracy 
score <2, 47% of participants) and high numerates (numeracy score ≥2, low: 47%, high: 52%, 
missing: 1%). In the benefits condition, in set I, 59% of the low numerates in scenario A and 
56% in scenario B chose the certain option compared with 70% and 63% of the high 
numerates. In set II, all high numerates chose the superior option in both scenarios. Among 
low numerates, 82% and 89% chose this option (for scenarios C and D, respectively). In set 
III, 85% of low numerates and 96% of high numerates chose the on average better option 
when it was certain (scenario E). In scenario F—where the on average better option had high 
ambiguity—70% of the low numerates and 74% of the high numerates chose the on average 
better and high ambiguity option. 
In the harms condition, in set I, 61% of low numerates compared with 54% of high 
numerates chose the high ambiguity option (scenario A). In scenario B, 53% of the low 
numerates and only 68% of high numerates chose the low ambiguity option. In set II, 
independent of numeracy, all participants chose treatment 2. Finally, in set III, scenario E 
showed an equal percentage of low and high numerates choosing treatment 2 (83% and 86%); 
in scenario F, 70% of low compared with 79% of high numerates chose treatment 2.  
Summary of Experiment 1a  
In summary, when two treatments had the same average rate, but differed in their 
degree of ambiguity, we found a slight tendency for ambiguity aversion in the benefits 
condition when ambiguity was high. When treatments differed also in the average rate, the 
vast majority chose the superior option when ambiguity was low. When ambiguity was high, 
choices were influenced by the degree of ambiguity. In the benefits condition, when the on 
average better option had high ambiguity, about one fourth of participants chose the certain 
but on average inferior option. In the harms condition, when the on average inferior option 
had high ambiguity, about one fourth of participants chose this option over the on average 
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better and certain option. Across all scenarios, choices of low numerates showed higher 
variance. 
Experiment 1b 
In Experiment 1a one treatment option was presented as certain and the other one as 
ambiguous. Do participants show a similar choice behavior, when both treatments are 
ambiguous? Participants who were presented with one certain and one ambiguous treatment 
option may have doubted the precision of the certain option. Consequently, they may have 
formed some “subjective” ambiguity around the precise estimate and also interpreted it as the 
midpoint of an unspecified range. Moreover, as pointed out in the introduction, a precise point 
estimate can rarely be justified in evidence based medicine (Politi et al., 2007). Hence, 
Experiment 1b aimed at studying participants’ choice behavior when both treatment options 
include ambiguity information.  
 We expected similar results as in Experiment 1a—the substitution of the certain option 
with a low ambiguous option should not change people’s choice pattern. More precisely, we 
expected participants to be indifferent when only the degree of ambiguity between options 
differed. When options differ in their average outcomes, we expect that participants can 
identify the overall superior option. When there is no superior option—e.g., due to different 
ranges—we still expect that the majority of participants choose the option with the higher 
average rate in the benefits condition, and the lower average rate in the harms condition. 
Method 
Design and Procedure. We used the same design as in Experiment 1a with one 
modification. Instead of presenting one treatment as certain and the other as ambiguous, both 
treatments were ambiguous but differed in their degree of ambiguity (low vs. high). The 
number of scenarios was thereby reduced to four. Table 2 gives an overview of the four 
scenarios and the three sets. Again, set I represented a scenario in which treatments have the 
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same average rate but one option had low ambiguity (range = 4) and the other one high 
ambiguity (range = 20). In set II, both treatments were high in ambiguity (range = 20) and 
differed in their average rate, which was higher in treatment 1. Finally, in set III, treatments 
differed in both the average rate and the degree of ambiguity. For instance, treatment 1 in 
scenario C had a higher average rate than treatment 2 and low ambiguity, whereas treatment 2 
had a lower average rate and high ambiguity. In scenario D, treatment 1 had a higher average 
rate than treatment 2 and high ambiguity, whereas treatment 2 had a lower average rate and 
low ambiguity. 
Table 2.  
The Four Scenarios of Experiment 1b. Random Halves of Participants Were Told that the Treatment 
Information Is Either About Benefits or Harms, Respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, half of participants received scenarios with the information about treatment 
benefits; the others received scenarios with the information about treatment harms. Numeracy 
was assessed after participants had made their choices in all four scenarios. 
Set Ambiguity Scenario Treatment 1  Treatment 2 
I 
(same average 
rates, low vs. 
high ambiguity) 
low vs. high A 18 - 22 10 – 30 
II 
(different average 
rates, high 
ambiguity ) 
high vs. high B 10 - 30 7 - 27 
II 
(different average 
rates, low vs. 
high ambiguity) 
low vs. high C 18 - 22 7 – 27 
high vs. low D 10 – 30 15 – 19 
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Participants. In total, 104 participants took part in this Experiment (n=53 in the 
benefits and n=51 in the harms condition). The average age was 36 years (SD=12.6), and 55% 
were female. Participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk and randomly assigned to one of 
the two conditions {harms, benefits}. Remuneration was $0.75.  
Results 
Treatment Choice. First, we present results for the benefits condition (Figure 3). In 
set I (same average rates, low vs. high ambiguity), 57% chose the treatment with low 
ambiguity (two-tail binomial test, p=.41). Similarly to Experiment 1a, we did not find an 
effect of ambiguity aversion. In set II (different average rates, high ambiguity), the vast 
majority (91%) chose the superior option (treatment 1, two-tail binomial, p=.001). In set III 
(different average rates, low vs. high ambiguity), similar to Experiment 1a, the majority in 
scenario C chose treatment 1 over treatment 2 (93%; two-tail binomial, p=.001); in scenario 
D 72% chose treatment 1—consequently, one fourth chose the on average inferior, but less 
ambiguous treatment (two-tail binomial, p=.002).  
 
Figure 3. Percentages of participants who chose treatment 1 in Experiment 1b for the benefits 
condition. Total refers to all participants (n=53); low numerates to participants with a numeracy score 
<2 (n=23); high numerates to participants with a score ≥2 (n=29). 
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When it comes to harms (Figure 4), about half of the participants chose the less 
ambiguous option (47% vs. 53% choosing the high ambiguous option; two-tail binomial, 
p=.78). In set II, the vast majority (94%, two-tailed binomial, p=.001) chose treatment 2 that 
was superior (i.e., it showed a lower rate of harms). In set III, again similar to Experiment 1a, 
choices were influenced by the degree of ambiguity. In scenario C, most participants chose 
treatment 2 (91%, two-tailed binomial p=.001), but in Scenario D only 81% (two-tailed 
binomial, p=.001) chose treatment 2 that had a lower average rate and lower ambiguity. 
 
Figure 4. Percentages of participants who chose treatment 2 in Experiment 1b for the harms condition. 
Total refers to all participants (n=51); low numerates to participants with a numeracy score <2 (n=16); 
high numerates to participants with a score ≥2 (n=35). 
 
Numeracy. Again, we categorized participants as low numerates and high numerates 
(low 39%, high: 58%, missing: 3%). In the benefits and harms condition, across all scenarios, 
low numerates showed higher variance in choices than high numerates (see Figure 3, 4). 
Particularly in scenario D in the benefits condition, 57% of low numerates versus 86% of high 
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numerates chose treatment 1. In the harms condition of scenario D, 69% of low and 89% of 
high numerates chose treatment 2.  
Summary of Experiment 1b 
  In summary, results of Experiment 1b extended and replicated findings of Experiment 
1a. When both treatments had the same average rates and only differed in the degree of 
ambiguity, we did not find a majority of participants being ambiguity averse in the benefits 
condition or ambiguity seeking in the harms condition. Moreover, when both treatments only 
differed in the average rate and had equal ambiguity, participants chose the superior option. 
Again, there was a difference between the harms and benefits condition. In the benefits 
condition, variance in choice was higher when the on average better option had high 
ambiguity. Hence, more participants preferred the certain option, although it was on average 
inferior. In the harms condition, the pattern was the opposite: when the on average inferior 
option had high ambiguity, more people choose this option instead of the on average superior 
and less ambiguous option. 
Discussion Study 1 
We did not find strong evidence supporting that people are ambiguity averse when 
presented with treatment benefits (H1a), or ambiguity seeking when presented with treatment 
harms (H1b). Only in the benefits condition when one option was certain and one highly 
ambiguous, a small majority chose the certain option. Yet, when two treatments differed only 
in their degree of ambiguity, we did not observe a majority opting for the certain option in the 
benefits condition, or the ambiguous option in the harms condition. Moreover, even when 
presented with ambiguity, participants were able to find a superior option, independent of 
whether benefits or harms were presented (H2a). When there was no superior option, we still 
found that the majority chose the treatment that had the higher average rate of benefits or the 
lower rate of harms (H2b). However, up to one third of participants in the benefits condition 
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chose the option with the lower average when this was certain. This indicates that at least a 
minority acted in line with ambiguity aversion. In the harms condition, about one fourth of 
participants chose the option with the higher average rate of harms when this had high 
ambiguity. This indicates that at least a minority sought for ambiguity in the harms condition, 
most likely because the option with high ambiguity had a smaller lower bound. Hence, despite 
of the worse average rate and greater upper bound, some participants were rather optimistic 
by focusing on the lowest possible outcome. 
Across scenarios, we observed a similar pattern for low and high numerates (H3). 
Hence, low and high numerates did neither differ with respect to ambiguity aversion in the 
benefits scenarios nor ambiguity seeking in the harms scenarios. Moreover, both groups were 
able to identify a superior option if present. Yet, low numerates showed slightly higher 
variance in choices, so primarily low numerates accounted for differences in treatment choice.  
Ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking are only one potentially explanation for 
people’s choices under ambiguity. Heath and Tversky (1991) propose that people react averse 
towards ambiguity because they feel uncomfortable with the lack of knowledge. Viscusi and 
colleagues (1991) propose that ambiguity shifts people’s attention to the worst possible 
outcome. In our study, the question why some participants selected the certain option over the 
ambiguous option in the benefits condition could also be a consequence of the lower bound of 
the range which was smaller when ambiguity was high. In other words, these participants 
could have also focused on the worst possible outcome (the lowest possible rate of benefits) 
of each option. Likewise, in the harms condition, those opting for the treatment with high 
ambiguity must have focused on the lower bound—the best possible outcome (the lowest 
possible rate of harms) which coincided with the high ambiguity option. Experiment 1a/b did 
not allow us to disentangle the actual reason why a participant chose a particular treatment—it 
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could have been due to ambiguity aversion, the lower bound, the upper bound, or the 
midpoint of the range of possible benefits of harms. 
Study 2 
The main objective of Study 2 was to map peoples’ underlying choice strategies. As 
previously pointed out, ambiguity aversion is only one potential explanation (Heath & 
Tversky, 1991). Instead of focusing on the width of the range that signals the degree of 
ambiguity, one might shift attention to one of the bounds—either to avoid the worst possible 
outcome (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985, Visuci et al., 1991), or to seek the best possible outcome. 
For example, when comparing two treatments’ benefits, a patient might be primarily 
interested in avoiding the option that has a lower possible rate of benefits and compare the 
treatments’ lower bounds. In a similar vein, when comparing two treatments’ harms, a patient 
might be primarily interested in avoiding the highest possible rate of harms and compare the 
treatments’ upper bounds. This strategy is also described in the minimax heuristic according 
to which people only compare the worst possible outcome and choose the one with the more 
attractive worst outcome (Savage, 1951). This strategy has been found to predict people’s 
affect-rich choices (Pachur, Hertwig, & Wolkewitz, 2012). One can also shift attention to the 
option with the best possible outcome (upper bound in benefits condition, lower bound in 
harms condition). Finally, the two average rates—indicated by the midpoint of the range in 
the ambiguous option—can serve as basis for comparison. In the benefits condition, a higher 
average rate signals a better treatment, whereas in the harms a lower average rate does.  
In Study 2, we focused on the question which choice strategy underlies people’s 
treatment choice. Based on the findings from Experiments 1a and 1b, we expect rather high 
variability in people’s choices. For instance, when only the degree of ambiguity differed, half 
of participants opted for the certain and the other half for the ambiguous option. Only few 
studies investigated people’s choice strategies depending on numeracy. For instance, Pachur 
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and Galesic (2012) found that high numerates often followed the minimax heuristic in risky 
choice, whereas low numerates were more affective. However, how low and high numerates 
choose under ambiguity when benefits or harms has not yet been investigated. 
Method 
Design and Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 
1a/b, except that participants were randomly assigned to only one out of six hypothetical 
medical scenarios.4 In set I, both options had the same average rates, but differed in their 
degree of ambiguity; in set II and III also the average rates differed (Table 3).  
Table 3.  
The Six Scenarios of Experiment 2. Random Halves of Participants Were Told that the Treatment 
Information Is Either About Benefits or Harms.  
 
                                                             
4 From Experiment 1a, we selected one scenario from each of the three sets; from Experiment 1b, we took the 
scenario from set I, and both from set III. Thereby, we included scenarios with either the same or different 
average rates and included scenarios that showed low and high variance in treatment choice in Experiment 1a/b  
Set Ambiguity Scenario Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
I 
(same average 
rates, low vs. 
high ambiguity) 
certain vs. high A 20 10 – 30 
low vs. high B 18 – 22 10 – 30 
II 
(different 
average rates, 
low ambiguity) 
low vs. certain C 18 – 22 17 
low vs. high D 18 – 22 7 – 27 
I 
(different 
average rates, 
high ambiguity) 
high vs. certain E 10 - 30 17 
high vs. low F 10 – 30 15 – 19 
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We assessed participants’ respective choice strategies by collecting verbal protocols. 
Each participant had to briefly state the major reason for choosing a particular option. 
Numeracy was again included with the Berlin Numeracy Test. 
Two independent raters coded participants’ choice strategies. Interrater-reliability was 
high (Cohen’s Kappa = .8). Each participant’s written statement was coded according to one 
of the four categories mentioned below. A fifth category was added for answers which did not 
match any choice strategy. 
(1) Ambiguity aversion: The participant states that she selected the treatment with the 
smaller range (i.e., the one which is less ambiguous). This strategy corresponds to the 
notion of ambiguity aversion. Example: “The [treatment 1] offers an exact number of 
people who appeared symptom-free after three days; whereas the [treatment 2] had 
numbers ranging from 10 – 30 making it appear that they were unsure of how many 
people were actually symptom- free.”  
(2) Midpoint: The participant states that she compared the average rate of the two 
treatments, independently of the range. Example: “Because 17 is actually a little lower 
than 20 which is the midpoint between 10 and 30.” 
(3) Lower Bound: The participant states that she compared both treatments’ lower bound 
(which equals the average rate if no range is present): “The minimum amount of 
people benefiting from the treatment is higher.” 
(4) Upper Bound: The participant states that she compared both treatments’ upper bounds 
(which equals the average rate if no range is present): Example: “Up to 30 people were 
symptom-free vs. 17” 
(5) Unidentified: Some participants’ answers could not be identified. Example: Most 
participants in scenario C simply justified the selection of treatment 1 with “better 
statistics”. Hence, this scenario resulted in a high number of unidentified answers.  
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Note that the choice strategies have different implications for the benefits and harms 
condition. In the benefits condition, a higher midpoint signals a better treatment; a focus on 
the lower bound signals that participants focused on the treatments worst possible outcomes 
(the lowest possible rate of benefits); a focus on the upper bound signals that participants 
focused on the treatments with the best possible outcome (the highest possible rate benefits).  
For harms, the lower the midpoint the better a treatment; the lower bound here signals the best 
possible outcome (lowest possible rate of harms); the upper bound the worst possible outcome 
(highest possible rate of harms). If ambiguity averse, one should choose the treatment with the 
smaller range, independent of whether benefits or harms were at stake. 
Participants. In total, 514 participants took part in this Experiment (n=261 in the benefits 
condition and n=253 in the harms condition) of which 45% were male. The average age was 
32.6 (SD=12.9). Participants were recruited using Amazon MTurk. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the six scenarios. Remuneration was $0.75.  
Results 
Treatment Choice and Reasoning. Participants’ treatment choices in Study 2 were 
consistent with the findings of Experiment 1a/b (see Appendix). In the following, we will 
present results for each scenario’s choice and participants choice strategies. First, we show 
findings for the benefits condition (Table 4).  
In set I—same average rate, low versus high ambiguity—60% of the participants 
chose the certain option (two-tailed binomial, p=.203) in scenario A (see Appendix). Were 
participants who chose the certain option ambiguity averse or decided based on the lower 
bound? Two thirds of those followed an ambiguity aversion strategy whereas 20% made 
choices based on the lower of the two lower bounds of the range (i.e., they avoided the lowest 
possible rate of benefits). Of the participants who made choices in favor of the ambiguous 
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option, 95% made their choice based on the higher of the upper bounds of the two treatments 
(i.e., they focused on the best possible rate of benefits). In scenario B—different average rate, 
low ambiguity—half of the participants chose the less ambiguous option (51%; two-tailed 
binomial, p=1). Of those, 26% stated that they chose this option due to its smaller range (i.e., 
ambiguity aversion), whereas 57% made choices based on the worst possible outcome (i.e., 
lower bound). Of all participants who chose the highly ambiguous option, 96% made their 
choices due to the higher upper bound (i.e., higher possible rate of benefits). 
 In set II—different average rate, high ambiguity—a clear majority of participants 
made choices in favor of treatment 1 in both scenarios (91% and 93% for scenario C and D, 
respectively, see Appendix). As mentioned above, it was not possible to disentangle 
participants’ choice strategies in scenario C. In scenario D, half of the participants (55%) who 
chose treatment 1 made choices based on the midpoint (which was higher than the average 
rate of treatment 2); 30% indicated that they were ambiguity averse (choices in favor of 
treatment 1 due to its smaller range), and 15% made choices based on the higher of the two 
lower bounds. All participants who chose treatment 2 made choices based on the higher of the 
two upper bounds.  
In line with Experiment 1a/b, set III yielded higher variance in participant’s choices 
(see Appendix). About two thirds of participants chose the highly ambiguous treatment 1 in 
scenario E and F (two-tailed binomial, p=.02; p=.038). In scenario E, 69% chose treatment 1 
based on the midpoint and 31% based on the upper bound; when making a choice in favor of 
the less ambiguous treatment (treatment 2), 39% indicated that they were ambiguity averse 
and 23% made choices based on  the lower bound. In scenario F, 44% chose treatment 1 
based on the average rate and 48% based on the upper bound. Those who chose the less 
ambiguous treatment 2 indicated to be ambiguity avers (23%) or made choices based on the 
lower bounds (54%).  
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Which strategies underlay participants’ choices when harms were presented (Table 5)? 
In scenario A of set I (see Appendix), 54% chose the certain option (two-tailed binomial, 
p=.85. Participants indicated ambiguity aversion (47%) and the higher of the two upper 
bounds (27%) as choice strategy. Participants who chose the high ambiguity option indicated 
the lower bound (the best possible outcome) as choice strategy (85%). In scenario B, half of 
the participants chose the less ambiguous option (two-tailed binomial, p=.39) and indicated 
either ambiguity aversion (32%) or the higher of the two upper bounds (46%) as choice 
strategy. The other half chose the option that had high ambiguity indicating the lower bound 
(best possible rate of harms) as choice strategy (86%). 
In set II, 98% chose treatment 2 in scenario C—as mentioned before, it was not 
possible to indicate their choice strategy. In scenario D, 92% chose treatment 2 (see 
Appendix)—41% indicated the midpoint and 50% the lower of the two lower bounds as 
choice strategy. Participants choosing treatment 1 indicated primarily the upper bound as 
choice strategy. 
In set III, there was a slightly higher variance in choices than in set II. In scenario E, 
83% of participants chose treatment 2 (two-tailed binomial, p=.001)—the majority (58%) 
indicated the midpoint, one third indicated ambiguity aversion and 6% the lower of the two 
upper bounds as choice strategy. When participants chose treatment 1 (86%), they indicated 
the lower of the two lower bounds as choice strategy. In scenario F, 79% of participants chose 
treatment 2 (two-tailed binomial, p=.001)—the majority 49% chose this option due to the 
midpoint, 24% the lower of the two upper bounds and 17% ambiguity aversion. Again, when 
participants chose treatment 1, they indicated the lower of the two lower bounds (46%) as 
choice strategy. 
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Numeracy. We categorized participants into low and high numerates (low: 34%, high: 
65%, missing: 1%). In line with Experiment1a/b, low numerates showed higher variance in 
their choices than high numerates. Particularly in set III in the harms condition, 29% and 35% 
of low numerates compared with 11% and 16% of high numerates made choices in favor of 
treatment 1 (see Appendix). In other words, more low numerates aimed for the best possible 
outcome of the harms (focusing on the lower bounds as choice strategy). When it comes to the 
underlying choice strategies, we will only discuss scenarios, in which low and high 
numerates’ choice strategies differed, for reasons of brevity. It should be noted that due to a 
limited sample size of low numerates, results are only tentative.  
We first present differences for the benefits condition: In set I, more high numerates 
than low numerates in scenario A and B indicated ambiguity aversion as choice strategy to 
choose the certain option (scenario A: 78% of high vs. 28% of low numerates; scenario B: 
38% of high vs. 10% of low numerates). In other words, a higher proportion of low numerates 
than high numerates compared the lower bounds of the two treatments (scenario A: 28% of 
low vs. 8% of high numerates; scenario B: 85% of low vs. 44% of high numerates). In set III, 
86% of low numerates compared with 53% of high numerates indicated the midpoint and 
14% of low numerates compared with 47% of high numerates indicated the upper bound as 
choice strategy. There were no differences in high and low numerates for those choosing 
treatment 2.  
When it comes to harms, we again found a higher proportion of high numerates 
choosing the certain indicating ambiguity aversion as choice strategy (scenario A: 20% of low 
vs. 60% of high numerates; scenario B: 13% vs. 40%); however, more low numerates who 
chose the certain option indicated the lower of the two upper bounds as choice strategy 
(scenario A: 30% of low vs. 20% of high numerates; Scenario B: 62% of low vs. 40% of high 
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numerates). In set II and III, we did not find any differences in choice strategy due to the 
higher variance.  
Discussion Study 2 
Findings of Experiment 2 were in line with Experiment 1a/b—participants made 
similar choices within the scenarios and the variance in choices was higher in low numerates 
than in high numerates. Moreover, we mapped participants’ choice strategies and thereby 
extended previous findings. Overall, we observed a large heterogeneity in participants’ choice 
strategies; there was no dominant choice strategy. Even when a majority of participants made 
choices in favor of one treatment, the underlying strategies were quite diverse. Interestingly, 
when both options only differed in the degree of ambiguity, about half of the subjects were 
optimistic. More precisely, in the benefits condition, half focused on the upper bound of the 
ambiguous option, and in the harms condition, half focused on the lower bound of the 
ambiguous option. 
Differences between low and high numerates indicate that a higher proportion of low 
numerates focused on the lower of the two lower bounds in the benefits condition and higher 
of the two upper bounds in the harms condition. However, when low and high numerates 
chose the same option differences in choices strategies were small.  
In sum, whereas research suggests that ambiguity makes people uncomfortable due to 
lack of knowledge (Fox & Tversky, 1995) or the shift in attention to the worst possible 
outcome (Viscusi et al., 1991), the present results indicate that individuals deal differently 
with ambiguity. Numeracy is one potential moderator. We found similar differences in choice 
patterns between low and high numerates, but when choosing the same option, the underlying 
choice strategies were similar between both groups. Further dispositional factors might help 
to explain people’s different choice strategies. Yet, situational factors—the degree of 
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ambiguity and differences in the average rates—play an important role and trigger different 
choice strategies. For instance, more people stated ambiguity aversion as their choice strategy 
when one option was certain and one ambiguous. Presenting both option as ambiguous 
reduced ambiguity aversion, and more people shifted attention to the respective bounds.  
General Discussion 
The present findings may question the general claim that people cannot choose 
medical treatments under ambiguity. In fact, the vast majority of the participants in our 
studies chose the “superior” treatment in most scenarios. Whether ambiguity increases 
complexity in the medical choice behavior rather depends on the distinctiveness of the 
treatment outcomes—the more choice strategies favor a specific option, the smaller variance 
in choices should be. For instance, when the range of options does not overlap, ambiguity is 
very informative as one option can be clearly identified as superior. When the range of 
options overlaps, complexity is high as one or more strategies make contradicting predictions. 
Yet, we found a majority of participants choosing the same option. Those who deviated from 
majority choice were either more concerned about the worst possible outcome or best possible 
outcome.  
Our findings have at least two important theoretical implications. First, there was no 
evidence for ambiguity aversion in treatment choice when benefits were presented. Moreover, 
we did not find evidence for ambiguity seeking when harms were presented. This challenges 
classical views on people’s behavior under ambiguity. One potential explanation is the 
context in which decisions take place. Previous research on ambiguity aversion and seeking 
was based on fictitious monetary gambles. In such situations an optimal solution is 
mathematically traceable—a standard based on which behavior is evaluated. However, 
monetary gambles hardly reflect real-world decisions. The medical scenarios represent an 
important context in peoples’ lives. In this context, causal mechanisms have a long history 
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and play an important role. For instance, throughout their evolutionary history, people had to 
quickly learn whether a specific substance causes an illness or death. Therefore, medical 
information might be encoded differently and is not easily changed by numerical evidence 
only (Müller, Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Maldonado, 2012).  
Second, in contrast with previous research on ambiguity aversion, we found a 
diversity of choice strategies. This diversity depends on at least two factors: the scenario 
(situational factors) and individual differences (dispositional factors). Depending on the 
treatments’ effectiveness and the degree of ambiguity, participants applied different choice 
strategies. This indicates that concepts like ambiguity aversion or seeking are not universal, 
but have to be evaluated in light of factors such as the context (medical, financial), the frame 
(gain vs. loss), the perspective (choosing for oneself vs. choosing for others), and the given 
odds and degree of ambiguity. The heterogeneity in choice strategies could also be partially a 
consequence of individual differences. Some participants’ choices represented a rather 
optimistic view on the expected outcomes; others’ choices represented a pessimistic and more 
conservative strategy. Han and colleagues (2010) also argue that dispositional factors such as 
optimism may account for individual differences in choice strategies. Numeracy seems to 
moderate the results only slightly. In line with previous findings, low numerates had little 
more difficulties in identifying a superior option when it existed (e.g., Peters et al., 2006; 
Pachur & Galesic, 2012). Yet, we found that low and high numerates had similar choice 
strategies, although more low numerates were concerned about the lower bounds in the 
benefits (pessimistic treatment choice) as well as in the harms condition (optimistic treatment 
choice).  
These findings have important practical implications. In many medical decisions, it is 
not possible to define an optimal solution (Feufel & Bodemer, 2012). In these situations, it is 
important to communicate complete information, so people can decide based upon their 
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individual preferences, values, and needs. These differences may be presented by the 
heterogeneity in choice strategies in our studies. An interesting example is the implementation 
of the human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine. In Germany, researchers questioned the 
admission of the vaccine due to a lack of knowledge about its effectiveness and potential side-
effects (Dören et al., 2008). However, statistical information and in particular information 
about the ambiguity of effectiveness and side-effect estimates were hardly provided in patient 
information (Bodemer et al., 2012). Yet, due to the controversy and limited evidence, such 
information would have been important for a decision maker—primarily parents and young 
girls—to evaluate the level of evidence and decide whether to get vaccinated or not.  
The present findings also point to future lines of research. First, only little is known 
about how adaptive people are to situational factors when ambiguity is present. For instance, 
Leonhardt and colleagues (2011) found that when choosing for others, people actually tend to 
seek for ambiguity, but not when choosing for themselves. Moreover, different domains may 
trigger different choice strategies (Müller et al., 2012). People’s tendency to be risk seeking or 
shift attention to the best possible outcome may also depend on the severity of a disease, or 
how effective a treatment actually is. For instance, in our examples the benefits were rather 
low (on average 20 out of 100). Second, individual differences to better tailor information to 
patients’ require a better understanding not only of situational factors, but also on 
dispositional factors such as optimism or tolerance for uncertainty (Furnham & Ribchester, 
1995). Third, we simplified treatment choice by keeping either the benefits or harms constant. 
In most medical decisions, both have to be taken into consideration and may point into 
different choices. For instance, a treatment with a higher benefit may go along with a higher 
risk of harms. This adds complexity and potentially influences choice strategies. A fourth line 
of research points to the presentation format of ambiguity. In line with previous research, we 
presented ambiguity with a range (e.g., Han et al., 2009, 2010; Schapira et al., 2001). 
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However, little is known about how people interpret a range and how it affects choice 
strategies. The fact that laypeople are rather unfamiliar with the concept of ambiguity and its 
presentation (Ibrekk & Morgan, 1988; Politi et al., 2007), raises the question how people 
actually interpret such information. For instance, whereas one might perceive the midpoint of 
the range as the most likely value, one could also assume that each value within the range is 
equally likely. We need to better understand how people—in particular low numerates—
interpret the range, and whether we can present ambiguity more intuitively. For instance, 
graphical tools such as icon arrays (pictographs) have been shown to improve people’s 
understanding of risks (Bosnjak & Pahl, 2011; Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 
2009; Gaissmaier et al., 2011) 
In sum, the communication of ambiguity in medical risk communication increases 
transparency and helps patients to choose treatments in line with their individual preferences. 
We argue that participants can and should be informed about the ambiguity of treatment 
benefits and harms to satisfy their individual preferences, needs, and values.    
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Appendix 
 
 
Percentages of participants who chose treatment 1 in Experiment 2 – benefits condition (above: 
total n = 261, low numerates n = 87, high numerates n = 170) and percentages of participants 
who chose treatment 2 in Experiment 2 – harms condition (below: total n = 253, low numerates 
n = 81, high numerates n = 171 ).  
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General Discussion 
In this dissertation, I presented theoretical and empirical research that contributes to a 
better understanding of how we can help patients making informed decisions. Using 
theoretical concepts and methods from psychology to gain insights into the mechanism of 
how laypeople understand and perceive risks, I derived important implications for future 
research and practice.  
Building a basis for a health care system in which patients actively and responsibly 
participate in their medical decisions requires transparent, complete, and intuitive information. 
Therefore, we have to be aware of (1) which tools are available to foster “better” health care 
decisions, (2) the shortcomings in current risk communication, (3) how biased formats 
undermine the empowerment of patients, and (4) how we can present complete information 
including ambiguity. In this final chapter, I will briefly summarize what we have learned from 
the papers composing this dissertation and give an outlook of possible future directions for 
each of them. 
(1) Empowering patients—a matter of perspective 
There are two perspectives about the human rationality. Some argue that human’s use 
heuristics that are prone to biases leading to poor decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). 
These biases have been primarily documented in what Savage (1954) calls “small worlds”—
worlds in which an optimal solution can be computed. In other words, such situations are 
characterized by perfect knowledge about alternatives and probabilities. Bias is defined as 
human’s deviation from such a normative standard, being taken as the proof that people are 
not rational. As a consequence, people need guidance in form of nudges to overcome these 
biases (Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, Suhrcke, & Kelly, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
Nudging is based on the idea to design environments that prompt a particular behavior 
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without restricting any options. Yet, this perspective about the human mind is rather 
pessimistic. In most situations in our daily life, rarely—if ever—all alternatives and 
probabilities are known. Decisions are to be made under considerable uncertainty due to 
limited knowledge and limited capacities. In such situations an optimal solution is intractable 
and heuristics have been found to be very effective strategies (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 
2011; Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012). The term ecological rationality 
has been coined to describe the structure and representation of information in an environment 
and the match with mental strategies. Hence, the problem is less in the human mind, but in the 
way information is presented. Intuitive design follows this principle and aims at designing 
environments that match cognitive processes. One prominent example is the presentation of 
statistical information to patients in form of natural frequencies in contrast to conditional 
probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
These two perspectives about the human mind have led to different approaches to 
improve health decisions: on the one hand, nudging and social marketing resting on the 
former assumption, on the other hand empowerment resting on the latter assumption. In 
Chapter 2, I presented the differences, commonalities and applicability of these three 
approaches. Nudging and social marketing are limited to situations in which a normative 
standard can be clearly defined, for instance, when there is strong evidence proposing an 
“optimal” solution. However, in many medical situations patients and health professionals 
have to make decisions under uncertainty—an “optimal” solution does not exist. Moreover, 
what is “good” or “bad” is often not ultimate, but depends on the patient, her values and 
needs. Therefore, instead of imposing one solution, empowerment aims at transparently 
informing and educating patients to make medical decisions that suit their personal situation 
best. This builds a basis for shared decision making and informed consent (Gigerenzer & 
Gray, 2011).   
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However, the implementation of empowerment has to meet at least three challenges: 
First, like the nudging and social marketing approaches, positive effects of empowerment 
need to be proven. Therefore, empowerment strategies have to be evaluated on relevant health 
outcomes. Can empowerment reduce inequality in health care practice such as regional 
variability? Can it increase quality of life in patients? Can it make the health care system more 
cost-efficient? The second challenge addresses how empowerment can be implemented. 
Conflicts of interest in politics, industries and health professionals undermine efforts to 
educate patients (Gigerenzer & Gray, 2011). Patients have to learn which questions to ask and 
where to find transparent information. Independent institutions are one step towards providing 
transparent and complete information and help to educate future, risk literate generations. 
Third, to design environments based on the principle of ecological rationality, we need to 
better understand how patients actually process statistical information and make medical 
decisions. Which information is relevant for patients to decide between treatment 
alternatives? How can we communicate this information transparently to different target 
groups? A starting point to examine patient decision strategies and heuristics is given by the 
concepts of bounded and ecological rationality (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research 
Group, 1999).   
(2) A tool for empowerment: The media 
The media are one channel to empower patients (Grilli, Ramsay, & Minozzi, 2009). 
But are media reports based on transparent and complete information? In the third chapter, I 
presented the role of the media in medical risk communication, its opportunities and 
shortcomings. Based on recent findings in risk communication, I developed a coding scheme 
to evaluate reporting about the HPV vaccine in German and Spanish newspaper and Internet 
reports. The results showed that media reports hardly met the standards proposed for 
transparent, complete and correct information. Although the Internet reports communicated 
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more relevant information about the HPV vaccine, they still did not provide a basis for 
making informed decisions.  
Evaluating how the environment presents information is one part in the study of 
ecological rationality. The second part focuses on how people actually perceive and process 
the information provided and which consequences it has on behavioral outcomes. Few studies 
have demonstrated the influence of the media, for instance media reporting on health service 
utilization (Grilli et al., 2009). To shed more light on how the media—and particularly the 
Internet—shapes risk perception and decision making, we need to gain insights about how 
patients actually seek for information, which strategies they use and how they evaluate 
information and its communicators (Eysenbach & Köhler, 2002; Eysenbach, Powell, Kuss, & 
Sa, 2002; Feufel & Stahl, 2012; Hesse, Nelson, Kreps, Croyle, Arora, Rimer, & Viswanath, 
2005). For instance, Feufel and Stahl (2012) found that web users often stop web search after 
the first piece of evidence satisfying search intentions is found. Differences in age and web-
use skills also moderated participants’ search strategies. How such differences in strategies 
are influenced by the way the media present information can serve as a basis for changing the 
practice of media coverage about health issues as well as designing interventions for patients 
searching for such information. 
(3) Including baseline risk when communicating relative risk reductions 
One prominent example of biased reporting are relative risk reductions and increases. 
Laypeople as well as health professionals overestimate benefits or harms when changes in risk 
are expressed in relative rather than absolute terms (Akl et al., 2011; Edward, Elwyn, Covey, 
Matthews, & Pill 2001). Yet, relative risk changes are still predominant in risk 
communication (Gigerenzer, Wegwarth, & Feufel, 2010; Sedrakyan & Shih, 2007). Their use 
is sometimes defended with an argument that relative risk changes can be “debiased” if 
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baseline risk is included (Natter & Berry, 2005; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997). 
In four experiments, I tested the influence of the presentation format (percentage vs. 
frequency) and people’s numeracy abilities on the interpretation of relative risk changes with 
baseline risk. Results showed that the understanding of relative risk changes with baseline risk 
depends on (i) the presentation format used to communicate the baseline risk (percentage vs. 
frequencies) and (ii) people’s numeracy skills. Whereas high numerates understood relative 
risk reductions and increases independently of the presentation format, low numerates 
benefited only when the baseline risk was presented in frequencies rather than in percentages. 
Yet, we found that—independently of the presentation format and numeracy abilities—many 
participants still failed to correctly understand the information. Thus, relative risk changes, 
even when communicated with baseline risk, remain a source of confusion. This questions 
whether these formats are suitable in practice. 
 Future research can further investigate the role of the presentation format on people’s 
understanding of risk changes in dependence of numeracy. One stream of research tries to 
avoid numerical information as far as possible, and instead displays risks visually. For 
instance, icon arrays (pictographs) can help to overcome low numeracy (Galesic, Garcia-
Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010). However, only for those 
high in graph literacy visualization might be better than numerical formats, whereas for 
people low in graph literacy the opposite may be true (Gaissmaier, Wegwarth, Skopec, 
Müller, Broschinski, & Politi, 2011). Most statistics—may it be numbers or graphs—are so 
called descriptive statistics; they summarize statistical evidence. However, recent research in 
risky choice has shown that decisions about which option to choose may depend on whether 
one is presented with descriptive statistics or one actively samples outcomes separately 
(Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009). These 
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findings also have implications for risk communication and influence people’s treatment 
choice (Bodemer, Gaissmaier, & Nelson, 2012). 
Whereas most research focuses on one presentation format only, another issue is how 
laypeople and experts integrate and compare treatment effects that are framed in different 
formats. The phenomenon of mismatched framing—benefits are presented in relative risk 
reductions to appear large, whereas harms are presented in absolute risk increases to appear 
small—amplifies confusion (Gigerenzer et al., 2010). To make sense of statistics framed in 
different formats, one has to find a common denominator to compare the magnitude of 
effects. Frequency formats help people reasoning about statistical concepts (e.g., Moster, 
2002), but future research may address whether people transform percentage formats into 
frequency formats, or vice versa. 
(4)  Disclosing uncertainty: Presenting ambiguity in risk communication 
Providing complete information also includes the communication of uncertainty. 
Medical evidence is often limited, but this is rarely presented to patients (Bodemer, Müller, 
Okan, Garcia-Retamero, & Neumeyer-Gromen, 2012; Politi, Col, & Han, 2007). In Chapter 5, 
I questioned general objections against ambiguity communication such as people’s inability to 
handle it (Frewer, Hunt, Brennan, Kuznesof, Ness, & Ritson, 2003). Results showed that 
participants were able to find a superior treatment option even when ambiguity was presented. 
Moreover, heterogeneity in participants’ choice strategies extends previous research and 
demonstrates how important it is to consider individual differences in treatment choice under 
ambiguity. For instance, some participants were pessimistic and chose based on the worst 
possible outcome, others were optimistic and chose based on the best possible outcome. We 
suggest including ambiguity when presenting treatment benefits and harms to provide 
complete information about potential limitations of the existing evidence. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, presenting statistics in numerical format are 
only one way to communicate risks. Although I found only limited evidence for differences in 
numeracy, some studies suggest that numeracy plays a major role in medical decision making 
(Pachur & Galesic, 2012; Reyna, 2009). Hence, graphical formats present a promising 
alternative to visualize treatment effects with ambiguity. For instance, Bosnjak and Pahl 
(2011) propose bar charts with a confidence interval as an intuitive format to communicate 
ambiguity without increasing complexity.  
Moreover, further situational and dispositional factors are to be explored to provide a 
more thorough investigation of how people react towards ambiguity. Optimism as well as 
tolerance for uncertainty might help to predict people’s choice under ambiguity (Han, Klein, 
Lehman, Massett, Lee, & Freedman, 2010). Ambiguity and—in a broader sense—uncertainty 
is a major component of our environment and provide crucial information for a decision 
maker—may it be regarding financial, environmental, medical, or social issues.  
Conclusion 
In sum, the work presented here gave new insights into (medical) decision making, 
risk perception and risk communication. The findings show that empowerment is a crucial 
tool to improve health decisions; the media lack transparent communication of health 
information which calls for standard to improve reporting; one should be careful when 
communicating relative risk reductions and increases also along with baseline risk; and that 
ambiguity is an important element in medical decision making.  
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